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Abstract
Adolf Hitler's seizure of power was one of the most consequential events of the
twentieth century. Yet, our understanding of which factors fueled the astonishing
rise of the Nazis remains highly incomplete. This paper shows that religion played
an important role in the Nazi party's electoral success|dwarng all available so-
cioeconomic variables. To obtain the rst causal estimates we exploit plausibly
exogenous variation in the geographic distribution of Catholics and Protestants
due to a peace treaty in the sixteenth century. Even after allowing for sizeable
violations of the exclusion restriction, the evidence indicates that Catholics were
signicantly less likely to vote for the Nazi Party than Protestants. Consistent with
the historical record, our results are most naturally rationalized by a model in which
the Catholic Church leaned on believers to vote for the democratic Zentrum Party,
whereas the Protestant Church remained politically neutral.
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1. Introduction
Social scientists have long analyzed the role of elites in democratic transitions and break-
downs, revolutions and mass movements, as well as various other social phenomena (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Michels 1911; Mills 1956; Mosca 1896). Pareto (1916), for
instance, argues that true democracy is an illusion and that a ruling class will always emerge
to enrich itself. Consequently, he characterizes elites as those who are the most adept at
using the two modes of political rule: force and persuasion.
For centuries, the Catholic Church was a master of both. In medieval times it could exploit
its unique position at the intersection of spiritual and worldly authority to strong-arm rulers
and peasants alike. The advent of mass democracy, however, brought about fundamental
changes. If the Church or any other group of elites wanted to achieve their political goals
they now had to persuade the populus (for examples, see Ekelund et al. 2006; Gill 1998; or
Warner 2000). Such a radical shift in the \rules of the game" raises important questions.
Are voters susceptible to this form of inuence from above? To what extent are elites, such
as the Church and its dignitaries, able to wield power through \steering" the masses?
To shed light on these issues we present evidence from the Weimar Republic. Few historical
events have been more consequential than the failure of Germany's rst democracy and
Adolf Hitler's ensuing rise to power. Almost none are more dicult to understand. Even
contemporary observers were surprised by the Nazis' rapid success. In 1928 the Nazi Party
(NSDAP) won only 2.6% of votes. Within two and half years, however, its vote share increased
by a factor of seven, only to double again by 1932. At the end of the Weimar Republic in
1933, the NSDAP obtained 43.9% of the popular vote and was by far the largest faction in
parliament (see Figure 1).
With few exceptions Germany's traditional elites either condemned the Republic and sup-
ported conservative parties that sought to abolish it, or they remained politically uninvolved
(see, e.g., Mommsen 1989). By contrast, the Catholic Church remained supportive of the
new democracy. Scarred by Bismarck's Kulturkampf, the Church backed its traditional ally,
the democratic Zentrum (Centre Party).1
Promoting the political and cultural ideals of the Catholic Church, the Zentrum had been
the spearhead of Political Catholicism ever since its founding in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. Not only were many high-ranking party ocials ordained Catholic priests,
but the Church had traditionally tried to use its inuence to sway Catholics to vote for
the Zentrum (Anderson 2000). Between 1919 and 1932, the party participated in all of the
Weimar Republic's governing coalitions.
1Our description of the Zentrum Party and its election results always includes its Bavarian branch, the
Bavarian People's Party (BVP), even though it was formally a separate party.
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Alerted by the NSDAP's sudden success at the polls, the Church took an explicit anti-
Nazi position after the September elections of 1930. The German bishops even went so far
as to ocially forbid believers to join the NSDAP or to vote for it. Noncompliers were
threatened with excommunication and, in many instances, publically shamed (see, e.g., Abel
1938; Fandel 1997, 2002; Scholder 1977).
As one would expect if the Church's proscription was, indeed, eective, Figure 2 shows
that support for the Nazis was by no means uniform. Despite the onset of the World Eco-
nomic Crisis, majoritarian Catholic regions remained strongholds of the Zentrum. Voters in
predominantly Protestant areas, however, abandoned their traditional parties and ocked
toward the Nazis.
Although the link between religion and NSDAP vote shares may be surprising, we are not
the rst to recognize it. In fact, the rise of the Nazis is one of the most studied topics in
modern history, and scholars of fascism have unearthed numerous factors associated with
Nazi support (see, e.g., Brown 1982; Childers 1983; Falter 1991; Hamilton 1982; O'Loughlin
2002; among many others). However, as pointed out by King et al. (2008), this literature
draws only rarely on adequate econometric techniques, and the quantitative evidence that
does exist remains purely correlational.2
In the rst part of this paper we show that religion is the single most important predictor
of Nazi votes. More specically, constituencies' religious composition explains slightly more
than 40% of the county-level variation in NSDAP vote shares. All other available variables
combined (including electoral district xed eects) add only an additional 41%. We, there-
fore, argue that in order to fully comprehend the failure of Germany's rst democracy, one
needs to understand the role of religion and that of the Catholic Church.
While descriptive evidence on who voted for Hitler may by itself be interesting, it is in-
sucient to judge whether religion had a causal impact on the rise of the Nazis, and, if so,
through which channels it operated. King et al. (2008), for instance, argue that Protestants
and Catholics simply had divergent economic interests and that the relative weakness of the
NSDAP in predominantly Catholic areas is attributable to its inability to appeal to farmers.
The second part of the paper is devoted to showing that the eect of religion on the voting
behavior of Germans was indeed causal. Our evidence from the last fully free elections held
in November 1932 indicates that Catholics were about 28 percentage points less likely to
vote for the NSDAP than Protestants. Compared to an overall Nazi vote share of 33.1%, the
eect of religion is not only statistically but also economically highly signicant. Taken at
2Two recent exceptions are Adena et al. (2013) and Satyanath et al. (2013). Adena et al. (2013) estimate
the impact of radio propaganda on NSDAP vote shares, while Satyanath et al. (2013) examine the relationship
between cultural capital and support for the Nazis. Both papers use state-of-the-art econometric methods
to estimate causal eects.
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face value, our point estimates suggest that, ceteris paribus, Protestants were three to four
times more likely to vote for the Nazis than Catholics.
To obtain the rst causal estimates we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the geo-
graphic distribution of Catholics and Protestants due to a stipulation in the Peace of Augs-
burg in 1555. Ending decades of religious conict and war, the Peace of Augsburg established
the ius reformandi. According to the principle cuius regio, eius religio (\whose realm, his
religion"), territorial lords obtained the right to determine states' ocial religion and, there-
fore, the religion of all their subjects. While the treaty secured the unity of religion within
individual states, it led to religious fragmentation of Germany as a whole, which at this time
consisted of more than a thousand independent territories.3
Figure 3 depicts the spread of religion in the aftermath of the Peace. As the comparison
with Figure 2 demonstrates, the geographic distribution of Protestants and Catholics due
to lords' choices in the second half of the sixteenth century still resembles that during the
Weimar Republic, and it is highly correlated with NSDAP vote shares.
Nevertheless, for our instrumental variable estimates to have a causal interpretation, it
must be the case that princes' choices are orthogonal to unobserved determinants of indi-
viduals' voting decisions in 1932. This assumption is fundamentally untestable, but one may
be willing to judge its plausibility by considering the process that led to the adoption of a
particular faith.
Historians argue that most rulers were deeply religious and not only concerned about their
own salvation, but also that of their subjects. Thus, their religious conscience often dictated
a particular choice (see, for instance, Dixon 2002 and Lutz 1997). Moreover, politics of the
day, such as existing feuds or alliances, are believed to have played an important role (Scrib-
ner and Dixon 2003). Cantoni (2012) provides otherwise scarce statistical evidence, nding
that \latitude, contribution to the Reichsmatrikel [a proxy for military power], ecclesiasti-
cal status, and distance to Wittenberg [the origin of the Reformation movement] are the
only economically and statistically signicant predictors" of princes' decisions (p. 511). He
rationalizes these ndings through a theory of strategic neighborhood interactions, in which
territorial lords followed the lead of their more powerful neighbors.4
Although plausible (especially after controlling for the factors mentioned above), there is
no guarantee that the exclusion restriction required for a valid instrument is exactly satised.
We, therefore, use econometric techniques developed by Conley et al. (2012) to show that
3Not until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 were subjects formally free to choose their own religion.
4Rubin (2014) shows that cities that had a printing press at the beginning of the sixteenth century were
also more likely to adopt the Protestant faith, and Dittmar (2011) argues that they experienced faster
subsequent growth. To ensure that our results are robust to this potential confound, we explicitly control
for it.
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our main estimates are qualitatively robust to sizeable violations of the exclusion restriction.
That is, even if rulers' choices in the sixteenth century had an independent impact on the
voting behavior of Germans almost four hundred years later, as long as one is willing to
rule out that this independent eect exceeds 12.5 percentage points, one would still conclude
that religion exerted a signicant inuence on Nazi vote shares. To put this into perspective,
12.5 percentage points corresponds to almost half of all NSDAP supporters (among eligible
voters) in the November elections of 1932, to more than four times the dierence in the
voting behavior of urban and rural constituencies, or to the estimated impact of moving
almost the entire workforce from agriculture into manufacturing.
The third part of the paper argues that the eect of religion operated through the Catholic
Church pressuring believers to vote for the Zentrum Party, while the Protestant Church
remained politically neutral. Building on formal theories of conformity (e.g., Akerlof 1980
and Bernheim 1994), we develop a simple model of voting decisions in the face of pressure by
the Church. Five key pieces of evidence support the predictions of our model: (i) Religious
dierences in NSDAP vote shares are substantially smaller in areas where the Church's
ocial position was undermined by a priest who openly sympathized with the Nazis. (ii)
Religious dierences in NSDAP vote shares are much smaller in counties where, before the
advent of the Nazis, Catholics did not follow the Church's \recommendation" to vote for the
Zentrum. (iii) The eect of religion is larger in rural areas than in cities, where the Church
yielded arguably less inuence and where the pressure to conform is likely to have been
lower. (iv) Perhaps counterintuitively, our model predicts that Catholics and Protestants
should have been equally likely to support left-wing parties|despite the Catholic Church's
constant warnings about the dangers of Socialism. That is, the Church should have been able
to \dissuade" believers from voting for the NSDAP, but not from supporting the Communist
Party (KPD). This prediction is also borne out in the data. (v) Lastly, looking at dierent
proxy variables for Nazi ideology and anti-Semitism, we nd that religious dierences reversed
after March 1933, when the Catholic bishops gave up their opposition and took a position
favorable to Hitler.
By contrast, the data are incompatible with a number of alternative explanations for the
eect of religion on Nazi vote shares. For instance, by conditioning on measures of church
attendance and other religious activities, we can rule out that religiosity itself is driving our
results. Moreover, we nd that the eect of religion does not vary with the share of Catholics
in a county or municipality, which casts doubt on explanations based on traditional models
of peer eects, culture, and social milieus.
Naturally, our paper is closely related to a vast literature on the rise of fascism and the
downfall of Germany's rst democracy. We partially review these studies in Section 2. More-
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over, our analysis contributes to a growing literature on the economics of religion (e.g., Barro
and McCleary 2005, 2006; Basten and Betz 2013; Becker and Woessmann 2009; Campante
and Yanagizawa-Drott 2013; Iannaccone 1992, 1998; Spenkuch 2011) as well as to an impor-
tant body of work on the power of elites in shaping the political economy (e.g., Acemoglu
and Robinson 2000, 2001, 2005; Conley and Temimi 2001; Lizzeri and Persico 2004; Weingast
1997). While much of the latter focuses on elites' rent seeking and their role in the transition
towards democracy, we present evidence on the ability of elites to wield political inuence
through \steering" the masses, even after universal surage has been achieved.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background information
on the rise of the Nazis, while selectively reviewing the existing empirical literature. Section
3 describes the data and presents partial correlations. Our main results appear in Section
4. Section 5 discusses potential mechanisms, and the last section concludes. An Appendix
with ancillary results as well as the precise denitions of all variables used throughout the
analysis is provided on the authors' websites.
2. Historical Background and Previous Literature
2.1. The Fall of the Weimar Democracy and the Rise of the Nazis
With Germany's defeat in World War I came the end of her monarchy. Although the ensuing
revolution resulted in the signing of a democratic constitution, the Weimar Republic was o
to a bad start (see Table 1 for a list of key events that led to its eventual downfall).5
Public outrage over the Treaty of Versailles, the beginnings of a severe post-war ination
as well as several coup attempts and political assassinations all dragged the Republic into
turmoil. The primary beneciaries of the various crises were radical parties on both ends of
the political spectrum.
One of them was the National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP). Founded in 1919, the Nazi
Party was initially little more than one amongst many in the volkisch milieu of Munich. Yet,
under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, its 55th member and primary agitator, it soon became
known as the most radical, anti-Semitic party in Bavaria.
In November 1923, Hitler decided to take the initiative and overthrow the government.
Known as the Beer Hall Putsch and inspired by Mussolini's March on Rome, his \March on
Berlin" failed miserably. The NSDAP was subsequently outlawed and Hitler was convicted
of treason. The right-leaning court, however, sentenced him to only ve years in prison with
the possibility of parole after as little as six months.6
5The description in this section draws on the superb account of Mommsen (1989), among others.
6At the time, the justice system was heavily biased. Gumbel (1922), for instance, documents that oenders
from the political right received much milder sentences than those from the left.
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With Hitler behind bars the Nazi movement became disorganized and fragmented. The
NSDAP even \merged" with the German Volkisch Freedom Party (DVFP) to le a joint list
for the party's rst two national elections in 1924.
Overshadowed by the previous crises, the May elections of 1924 saw large gains of antide-
mocratic parties. The communist KPD, for instance, increased its vote share by more than
10% percentage points, whereas the Nazis obtained 6.5% of the popular vote.
Following the end of hyperination and aided by the Dawes Plan (which reduced Germany's
reparation payments), economic conditions steadily bettered over the course of 1924. So,
when snap elections became necessary in December of the same year, radical parties lost
support, while their democratic counterparts experienced considerable gains.
Notwithstanding parties' inability (or unwillingness) to compromise and despite multiple
changes to the governing coalition (which never had a secure majority), the economic and
political situation continued to improve. Parliament served the full legislative term, and the
period between 1924 and 1929 became known as the Republic's \Golden Era."
After Hitler's release from prison and with the ban on the Nazi Party lifted in February
1925, the Nazi movement began to regroup. In a radical change of strategy, Hitler was now
determined to ascend to power legally, i.e. by winning elections. Yet, until the fall of 1929
the NSDAP remained insignicant, achieving only 2.6% of the popular vote in 1928.7
All of this changed changed when publishing mogul Alfred Hugenberg and the right-wing
German National People's Party (DNVP) launched a large-scale media campaign against
the Young Plan (a treaty that further reduced Germany's reparations payments). While the
campaign itself was ultimately unsuccessful, it provided the Nazis with an opportunity to
gain national exposure. By the spring of 1930, Hitler and the NSDAP had become household
names.
Around the same time, Germany's ongoing economic and political stabilization came to an
abrupt halt. Due to the onset of the Great Depression, American banks withdrew short-term
loans on which German companies had been relying during the upturn, industrial production
declined by over 40%, and unemployment skyrocketed to a peak of about 6 million (i.e.
more than one in four workers) during the winter of 1932. Unable to eectively deal with
the problem of rising unemployment, the Weimar Republic's last democratically governing
cabinet stepped down in March of 1930.
The following September election saw landslide gains for the NSDAP. With a vote share
of 18.3%|more than seven times its previous result|the Nazis became the second largest
faction in parliament. Even contemporaries were surprised by NSDAP's sudden success.
7Due to strict proportionality rule with no minimum threshold, the NSDAP was still able to win 12 seats
in the Reichstag.
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Since radical parties had won the majority of seats, Heinrich Bruning, the previously
appointed Chancellor, circumvented the legislative prerogative of the Reichstag and instead
governed through the use of emergency decrees (according to Article 48 of the Weimar
Constitution). As would all of his successors.
Most historians now believe that Bruning deliberately pursued deationary policies to
make allied reparation demands look more and more unreasonable and improve Germany's
bargaining position.8 In May 1932, Reichsprasident Paul von Hindenburg replaced Bruning
with the well-known monarchist Franz von Papen. Even before the Reichstag could deliver
a vote of no condence, President von Hindenburg dissolved parliament and ordered new
elections.9
In light of worsening economic conditions and increasing radicalization of the political
climate, the extremist KPD and NSDAP won over half of all votes in July of 1932. For the
NSDAP this meant a doubling of its vote share from two years prior.
Despite Hitler's promise to tolerate the next presidential cabinet in exchange for new
elections and a lift of the ban on the SA (the NSDAP's paramilitary unit)|Hitler was even
oered a post in the cabinet|the new Reichstag issued a vote of no condence in its very
rst session. Consequently, it was dissolved yet again.
The subsequent November elections delivered hope for the embattled democracy. For the
rst time since 1928, the NSDAP actually lost votes. Although the Nazis were still the largest
faction in parliament, contemporary observers questioned Hitler's all-or-nothing strategy and
saw the party in decline.
Ironically, just two months later, General von Schleicher, Papen's successor as Reichs-
kanzler, was forced to step down. Fearing a military coup under von Schleicher's leadership
and urged by his group of advisors, President von Hindenburg named Hitler the new Chan-
cellor on January 30, 1933.
With only two other Nazis being part of Hitler's cabinet, the old conservative elites believed
they could control him.10 This assessment proved to be fatally wrong. Aided by the Reichstag
Fire Decree, which suspended most civil liberties, and with the help of the police apparatus
(which was under the control of Hermann Goring, then Prussian Minister of the Interior),
the Nazis started to persecute political enemies within a month after Hitler took oce.
Nevertheless, the NDSAP was unable to achieve an absolute majority in the Republic's
8Others, however, disagree. They argue that Bruning had no other choice given the economic situation.
See, e.g., Borchardt (1980) and Buttner (1989) for opposing views.
9Papen had originally been a member of the Zentrum, but was forced to leave the party when he accepted
the chancellorship.
10Franz von Papen, who rejoined the cabinet as vice chancellor, even proclaimed: \Within two months we
will have pushed Hitler so far in the corner that he'll squeak" (quoted in Fest 1973).
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last election of March 1933. While many KPD and SPD candidates had been imprisoned or
had ed the country, voters could still choose from all major parties and cast their ballots in
secret.11 Together, Communists and Social Democrats received more than 30% of votes. Yet,
with 43.9%, the Nazi Party was by far the largest faction in parliament. On March 23, 1933,
the newly constituted Reichstag sealed the end of the Republic by passing the Enabling Act.
Although the Nazis were backed by almost half of the electorate, historians often highlight
the role of elites in the failure of Germany's rst democracy (see, e.g., Buttner 2008; Fest 1973;
Kolb 1984; Schulze 1983). Due to the precarious situation during the Republic's founding,
the \old elites," i.e. landed nobility (Junker), the army's ocer corps, industrial tycoons,
judges, high-ranking bureaucrats, etc., were generally allowed to remain in their positions of
power. This led to a remarkable continuity between the old Empire and the new Republic
(Buttner 2008) and cemented preexisting cleavages (Lepsius 1966; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).
Mommsen (1989) emphasizes the broad antirepublican consensus within the old elites, and
Fest (1973) argues that Hitler would have never been appointed Chancellor had it not been
for von Hindenburg's advisors and the support of government ocials, army ocers, as well
as members of the nationalistic bourgeoisie.12
However, not every group of elites actively supported the Nazis. Despite a waging internal
debate about the perceived merits of National Socialism, the Protestant Church remained
ocially neutral (Scholder 1977). That is, according to the guidelines of its member churches,
priests were to remain politically uninvolved.13
The Catholic Church went even further. Alerted by the NSDAP's success in the September
elections of 1930, the German bishops took an explicit anti-Nazi stand. In the diocese of
Mainz, for instance, Catholics were ocially forbidden to be members of the Nazi Party, and
noncompliers could not receive any of the sacraments (cf. Muller 1963).
In the eyes of the Catholic Church, the NSDAP was not only an ideological opponent,
but also a threat to its political inuence, which had been secured through the Zentrum
Party ever since the end of Bismarck's Kulturkampf (Fandel 2002; Morsey 1988). According
to Deuerlein (1963), nobody of public standing opposed the Nazis more than the Catholic
Church and its dignitaries.
There exists, indeed, ample anecdotal evidence to support this assertion. For example, in
the small village of Waldsee the local priest is said to have warned parishioners that \whoever
11Irregularities in vote counts, etc. are believed to have been minor (see Bracher et al. 1960).
12Ferguson and Voth (2008) show that a signicant proportion of Germany's largest rms had substantial
links to the NSDAP and that they experienced large abnormal returns after Hitler took power.
13In practice this often meant that members of the NSDAP and its paramilitary groups would be allowed
to attend mass in full uniform and that \the `Amen' of the priest was drowned out by the `Sieg Heil' of the
brown formations" (Scholder 1977, p. 182).
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votes for Hitler will have to justify himself on Judgment Day. There is no bigger sin than
voting for Hitler!" (quoted in Fandel 1997, p. 35). Others called Hitler a \vagabond" and
withheld Easter communion or absolution from suspected Nazi supporters (see Fandel 1997,
2002). In fact, many parish priests went above and beyond the orders of their bishops. Kiener
(2009), for instance, mentions a Sunday sermon entitled \Heil Christ, not Heil Hitler!" during
which the priest chastised parishioners for supporting the NSDAP in the previous election.
In short, \in the Catholic milieu [. . . ] supporters of National Socialism paid for their political
beliefs with social ostracism" (Fandel 2002, p. 306).
For the Catholic Church such practices were hardly new. Since at least 1921 it had been
actively discouraging believers from supporting various leftist groups, such as the communist
KPD (Scholder 1977). And even before the founding of the Weimar Republic, the Church
had traditionally used its inuence to sway Catholics to vote for the Zentrum. Anderson
(2000), for instance, notes that during the Kaiserreich \the most important of all of the
parish clergy's task was to make sure that the Zentrum's ballots got distributed" (p. 131). It
was also common for Sunday sermons to remind parishioners of their \obligation" to \vote
according to their conscience"|a formula beloved by the clergy for the nod it made in the
direction of voters' freedom, all the while reminding them what \conscience" required of
every good Catholic (Anderson 2000, p. 132).
Although the Catholic Church and its dignitaries had been vigilant in resisting the Nazis
until the very last election in 1933, their resistance crumbled shortly after passage of the
Enabling Act. On March 28, 1933, Bishop Bertram issued an ocial statement calling the
\general proscription and warnings of National Socialism [. . . ] no longer necessary" (quoted
in Kiener 2009, p. 19; see also Gruber 2005). While the same statement contained other
more carefully worded passages, it was widely perceived as the \episcopacy's approval of the
Third Reich and its Fuhrer" (Scholder 1977, p. 320).
Some historians argue that the German episcopacy reversed its position to clear the way
for the concordat between the Holy See and Third Reich, which was reached only four
months later (e.g., Bracher 1956; Scholder 1977). Others, such as Becker (1968) or Stickler
(2009), deny such a connection. They argue that Hitler's mere promise to respect Catholics'
freedom of religion and to guarantee the continued existence of Catholic schools suced for
the Church to back down. Somewhat less controversial is Kershaw's (1985) assertion that,
as an institution, neither the Catholic nor the Protestant Church oered any meaningful
resistance during the Third Reich.
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2.2. Related Literature
As noted in the introduction, there exists a vast literature examining the correlates of Nazi
support (e.g., Brown 1982; Childers 1983; Falter 1991; Hamilton 1982; Hanisch 1983; King
et al. 2008; among many others). Although most of the literature is concerned with the
eect of class divisions and the worsening economic situation, we are by no means the rst
to point out the relationship between NSDAP vote shares and religion (see, for instance,
von Kuehnelt-Leddhin 1952, or Lipset 1963). Even contemporary observers had been aware
of the fact that the Nazis gained more votes in predominantly Protestant regions (see the
sources cited in Fandel 2002, or in Childers 1983).14
In the seminal account of elections during the Weimar Republic, Falter (1991) calcu-
lates that, until 1933, Protestants were about twice as likely to vote for the Nazi Party
as Catholics|a dierence borne out in various subsamples of the data. Although he argues
for a genuine eect of religion, Falter (1991) acknowledges that simple correlations (with-
out standard errors) are insucient to establish such a claim. In fact, he states that the
assumptions required for his estimates to have a causal interpretation are \in many cases
unrealistic" (Falter 1991, p. 443).
It may thus not be surprising that King et al. (2008) lament the lack of modern econometric
methods that have been brought to bear on the problem. With the exception of Adena et
al.'s (2013) analysis of the impact of radio propaganda, and Voigtlander and Voth (2012) and
Satyanath et al. (2013), who respectively study the role of historically rooted anti-Semitism
and social capital, the existing quantitative evidence on the determinants of Nazi support
remains purely correlational.
The resulting uncertainty about the eect of religion is reected in dierent explanations
for the patterns in Figure 2. Some attribute Catholics' apparent resistance to a distinctively
Catholic milieu with a close-knit network of clubs, unions, and other civic organizations
(e.g., Burnham 1972; Falter 1991; Heilbronner 1998; Kuropka 2012; Lepsius 1966). Others
emphasize the importance of observational dierences between Protestants and Catholics.
Brown (1982), for instance, shows that Nazis gained strong support from the Catholic petty
bourgeoisie, but not from Catholic peasants. In the most sophisticated study to date, King
et al. (2008) suggest that the correlation between religion and Nazi vote shares is entirely
spurious. More precisely, King et al. (2008) argue that Protestants and Catholics simply
had divergent economic interests, and the relative weakness of the NSDAP in predominantly
Catholic areas is attributable to its inability to appeal to farmers.
14This cannot be explained by the NSDAP's campaign strategy. Childers (1983) reports that the Nazis
tried extraordinarily hard to win over Catholics and that they were determined to weaken the Zentrum's
hold on its traditional constituents.
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Interestingly, neither of these explanations is in line with what Hitler himself believed.
According to Hitler, the NSDAP would only be able to \win over supporters of the Zentrum
[. . . ] if the curia abandoned it" (quoted in Scholder 1977, p. 304).
3. A First Look at the Data
3.1. Data Description and Summary Statistics
In order to shed light on the true role of religion and that of the Catholic Church, we rely
on ocial election results combined with information from the 1925 and 1933 Censuses.
These data were compiled by Falter and Hanisch (1990) from ocial publications by the
Statistische Reichsamt and are, for most election years, available at the county as well as
the municipality levels (see Hanisch 1988 or the Data Appendix to this paper for details).
Unfortunately, the Statistische Reichsamt never released municipality-level results for the
Reichstag elections in July and November of 1932. Since these were the last two elections of
the Weimar Republic that were undoubtedly free, much of our empirical analysis is conducted
at the county level.15 Unless otherwise noted, we restrict attention to the 982 counties with
nonmissing information on religious composition and election results in November 1932.16
Where appropriate we supplement our main analysis with municipality-level results for the
1930 and 1933 parliamentary elections. Reassuringly, our results are robust to the choice of
aggregation and election year.
Table 2A displays NSDAP vote shares over the course of the Weimar Republic. Note
well, the numbers therein do not match the ocial election results in Figure 1. In order to
avoid issues of endogenous turnout all vote shares throughout the remainder of the analysis
are calculated as a percentage of the entire voting-eligible population, whereas those in
Figure 1 refer only to valid votes. It is also worth pointing out that in 1924 the NSDAP did
not run under its own name but together with other right-wing parties. Notwithstanding
this caveat, the raw data reveal only small initial dierences between majoritarian Catholic
and predominantly Protestant counties. Between 1928 and 1930, however, these dierences
amplify until they reach about 13.4 percentage points in 1932. Given an overall NSDAP vote
share of 26.4%, it appears that Catholics were much more resistant to the allure of the Nazis
than Protestants.
At the same time, the descriptive statistics in Table 2B demonstrate that majoritarian
Catholic counties dier from their Protestant counterparts along several important dimen-
15The March elections of 1933 are generally regarded as \partially free." Despite considerable Nazi pro-
paganda and political persecution of Communists and Social Democrats, voters could still choose among all
major parties and mark their ballots in secret. Irregularities in vote counts are believed to have been minor
(see Bracher et al. 1960).
16We lose three observations due to missing data on their religious composition.
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sions.17 For instance, predominantly Catholic counties are more rural and employ a much
larger fraction of the work force in agriculture. Moreover, they have lower unemployement
rates and are more likely to be located in the south of the Weimar Republic, further away
from sea ports as well as major cities such as Berlin. Thus, any argument linking Nazi vote
shares to the religious composition of the electorate (and ultimately the Catholic Church)
must, at the very least, be based on an empirical strategy that carefully controls for all
observable dierences.
3.2. Partial Correlations and Bounds on the Causal Eect of Religion
To determine whether religion remains correlated with Nazi vote shares, even after controlling
for observable characteristics, we focus on the November election of 1932 and estimate models
of the following form:
(1) vc = d + Catholicc +X
0
c + "c.
Here, vc denotes NSDAP vote shares (among all eligible voters) in county c, Catholicc mea-
sures the share of Catholics, Xc is a comprehensive vector of controls, and d marks an
electoral district xed eect.
For comparison, in 1932 the Weimar Republic was roughly the same size as the current
state of California. It was subdivided into almost a thousand counties, which partition its 35
electoral districts. Thus, by including electoral district xed eects we account nonparamet-
rically for all factors that were approximately constant within these relatively small regions.
Table 3 presents results from estimating equation (1) by weighted least squares, with
weights corresponding to counties' voting-eligible population. To allow for arbitrary forms
of correlation in the residuals of nearby counties, standard errors are clustered by electoral
district. Moving from the left to the right of the table, the set of included controls grows
steadily.
The rst column of Table 3 shows that Catholicism and electoral support for the NSDAP
are strongly negatively correlated|just as one would expect based on Figure 2. Surprisingly,
by itself, counties' share of Catholics accounts for slightly more than 40% of the variation in
Nazi votes shares.
The next columns add covariates related to various demographic characteristics, economic
conditions as proxied by unemployment rates, as well as detailed controls for the composition
of the workforce. The latter are intended not only to account for the well-known dierences
17To show that religiously homogenous counties are fairly common, Appendix Figure A.1 presents a kernel
density estimate of the distribution of counties' share of Catholics.
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in the voting behavior of certain groups, like farmers or factory workers, but also to control
for potential heterogeneity in the impact of the economic crisis (beyond what is already
captured by unemployment rates). Column (6) also controls for geographical dierences,
such as latitude, longitude, distance to the nearest major city, etc. (see Table 2B for a
complete list), and column (7) adds electoral district xed eects.
Interestingly, voters in areas with a larger Jewish population seem to have been more likely
to support the NSDAP. Although the respective point estimates are large in economic terms,
they are estimated imprecisely due to the very limited range of the independent variable.
As suggested by much anecdotal evidence, factory workers and artisans are estimated to
have been 5 to 14 percentage points less likely to vote for the NSDAP than their counterparts
in agriculture (the omitted category). But again, large standard errors hamper our ability
to draw sharp conclusions.
Despite stark observational dierences between predominantly Catholic and Protestant
counties, the partial correlation between religion and NSDAP vote shares does not decline
with the inclusion of additional controls. In fact, the opposite appears to be true.
In our most inclusive specication Catholics are estimated to be about 29 percentage points
less likely to vote for the Nazis than Protestants. Not only is the point estimate statistically
highly signicant, but given an overall NSDAP vote share of 26.42% in November of 1932
(cf. Table 2A), it is economically very large.
Although the estimates in Table 3 control for more potential confounds than any other
estimates in the literature, they are purely correlational and do not have a causal interpre-
tation. However, given dierent assumptions on the severity of omitted variables bias, one
can derive bounds on the causal eect of religion.
Building on Murphy and Topel (1990) and Altonji et al. (2005), Oster (2013) shows how
to bound the true causal eect based on the sensitivity of the point estimates to adding
additional controls coupled with movements in the R2. More precisely, let Wc be the vector
of all unobserved covariates that explain Nazi vote shares on the county level, and dene
  Cov(Catholicc;Wc)
Cov(Catholicc;Xc)
, where Xc and Wc have been scaled to have variance one.
18 Intuitively,  
parameterizes how correlated unobserved covariates are with counties' religious composition,
relative to the controls that are included in the regression. Given the point estimates and the
R2 both before and after adding covariates, Oster (2013) provides formulas to calculate the
omitted variables bias for any given value of  . Thus, as long as the true degree of correlation
is smaller than  , the causal eect of religion must lie between the original estimate and the
one corrected for potential omitted variables bias.
Figure 4 depicts the results. The shaded region therein corresponds to the identied set
18Note that if Wc was observed, then equation (1) would become vc = d + Catholicc +X
0
c +W
0
c!.
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for dierent values of  . Due to the high R2 in our original regressions, the bounds on the
true  are fairly tight. In particular, if observables are at least as important for NSDAP vote
shares as unobservables, i.e. if  lies between  1 and 1, then we can rule out that omitted
variable bias is of rst-order importance.
Note that if one were to choose covariates randomly, then one would expect  to equal
one, whereas it should lie on the unit interval if the \most important" controls are included
rst. For the identied set to include zero, one would have to allow for  <  4:49. That is,
unobserved factors would have to be systematically \dierent" and more than four times as
\important" as those for which we already control. We believe that this is unlikely.
Taking the bounds in Figure 4 at face value, our results suggest that, all else equal,
Protestants were at least two and a half times more likely to vote for the Nazis than
Catholics.19 Thus, to fully comprehend Adolf Hitler's rise to power one must understand
the role of religion and that of the Catholic Church.
4. Estimating the Causal Eect of Religion
Naturally, this requires more-precise estimates of the causal eect of religion. We, therefore,
pursue an instrumental variables strategy based on the historical determinants of the geo-
graphic distribution of Catholics and Protestants. We then use Bayesian methods developed
by Conley et al. (2012) to assess the sensitivity of our conclusions with respect to violations
of the exclusion restriction.20
4.1. The Peace of Augsburg and Religion in Weimar Germany
As explained in the introduction, our empirical approach uses princes' choices of whether to
adopt Protestantism in the aftermath of 1555 as an instrumental variable for the religion of
Germans living in the same areas during the Weimar Republic. The comparison of Figures 2
and 3 suggests that both are strongly correlated. Here, we briey review the historical causes
for this pattern.21
At the beginning of the sixteenth century the German Lands were fragmented into sev-
eral hundred independent (secular and ecclesiastical) territories and free Imperial Cities.
19See Section 5 for details on how to calculate relative vote propensities.
20In Appendix A we present evidence from an alternative instrumental variables strategy. The results rely
on the instrument proposed by Becker and Woessmann (2009), i.e. distance to the city of Wittenberg|
the origin of the Reformation movement. Since distance to Wittenberg is highly colinear with our other
geographical covariates, and since it explains very little residual variation in counties religious' composition
after accounting for territorial lords' choices (meaning that it is a weak instrument), we do not use it in the
main part of our analysis. Nevertheless, the results from this alternative instrumental variables approach
support our ndings.
21The following summary borrows heavily from Spenkuch (2011), who rst used this instrument to study
religious dierences in labor market outcomes.
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Although formally governed by an emperor, political power within the Holy Roman Empire
lay, for the most part, with its territorial lords.
Despite widespread discontent about matters of church organization and abuses of power
by the clergy, the religious monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church remained essentially
unchallenged until the \Luther aair" in 1517. What those in power initially perceived as a
dispute among clergymen quickly spread to the urban (and later rural) laity and became a
mass movement.
After the Diet of Speyer in 1526, the German princes assumed leadership of the Refor-
mation movement. The Diet instituted that until a synod could settle the religious dispute,
territorial lords should proceed in matters of faith as they saw t under the Word of God
and the laws of the Empire. Princes who had privately converted to Lutheranism took this as
an opportunity to proceed with church reform in their state. As a devout Catholic, Emperor
Charles V, however, was determined to defend the (old) Church. Yet, his attempts to undo
the Reformation resulted only in the Schmalkaldic War.
Ending more than two decades of religious conict, the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 es-
tablished princes' constitutional right to introduce the Lutheran faith in their states (ius
reformandi). According to the principle cuius regio, eius religio (\whose realm, his reli-
gion"), the religion of a lord became the ocial faith in his territory and, therefore, the
religion of all people living within its connes.22 Only ecclesiastical rulers were not covered
by the ius reformandi (reservatum ecclesiasticum). A bishop or archbishop would lose his
oce and the possessions tied to it upon conversion to another faith. Ordinary subjects who
refused to convert were, conditional on selling all property, granted the right to emigrate (ius
emigrandi).
According to Scribner and Dixon (2003) only about 10% of the population ever showed a
lasting interest in the ideas of the Reformation, but as much as 80% adhered to a Protestant
faith at the end of the sixteenth century. Therefore, most conversions must have occurred
involuntarily. There exists, indeed, ample evidence that, until the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, the ius reformandi was often strictly enforced.23 Even residents of Imperial
Cities|although formally free|were frequently forced to adopt a particular faith. In these
towns, political power lay in the hands of local elites who virtually imposed the Reformation
(Dixon 2002).
Historians argue that rulers' choice of religion depended on multiple factors. Most lords
22In contrast to the Lutheran faith (Confessio Augustana), neither Calvinism nor Anabaptism was pro-
tected under the Peace of Augsburg. Nevertheless, a non-negligible number of territories underwent a Second
Reformation, in which Calvinism became the ocial religion.
23For instance, \heretics," i.e. those who did not adhere to the ocial state religion, faced the death
penalty in the Duchy of Upper Saxony (Lutz 1997).
15
were deeply religious and cared, not only about their own salvation, but also about that of
their subjects (Dixon 2002). Moreover, political considerations, such as ties between noble
families or the formation of alliances, contributed to the decision (Lutz 1997). On the one
hand, any converted territory had to fear losing the Emperor's support or drawing hostility
from neighboring states. On the other hand, rulers also stood to gain from introducing the
Reformation, as it allowed them to assert their independence and to take possession of church
property.24 The fact that territories' ocial religion often changed more than once, especially
when a new generation of princes took reign toward the end of the sixteenth century, suggests
that idiosyncratic factors also played an important role.25
Cantoni (2012) and Rubin (2014) provide otherwise rare empirical evidence on rulers'
choices and the spread of the Reformation. Cantoni (2012) reports that \latitude, contribu-
tion to the Reichsmatrikel [a proxy for military power], ecclesiastical status, and distance
to Wittenberg [the origin of the Reformation movement] are the only economically and sta-
tistically signicant predictors" of princes' decisions (p. 511). He rationalizes these ndings
through a theory of strategic neighborhood interactions, in which territorial lords followed
the lead of their more powerful neighbors. Rubin (2014) shows that cities which had a print-
ing press in 1500 were subsequently more likely to adopt Protestantism, presumably because
printing facilitated the spread of information.
Although individuals were formally free to choose their own faith after 1648, most terri-
tories of the Holy Roman Empire remained religiously uniform until the Reichsdeputations-
hauptschluss in 1803.26 This piece of legislation enacted the secularization of ecclesiastical
territories and the mediatization of small secular principalities. That is, ecclesiastical terri-
tories, Imperial Cities, and other small entities were annexed by neighboring states, thereby
reducing the number of independent territories from over a thousand to forty-eight Imperial
Cities and slightly more than thirty religiously mixed states (Nowak 1995). On a local level,
however, most areas remained religiously homogenous until the mass migrations associated
with Word War II.
24Formally, a reformed lord was head of the Protestant Church in his state. Of course, this did not apply
to Catholic rulers, who nevertheless often behaved \like popes in their lands" (Dixon 2002, p. 117).
25For instance, testing the reservatum ecclesiasticum, Archbishop Gebhard Truchse von Waldburg con-
verted to the Lutheran faith in order to be allowed to marry a Protestant canoness. He thereby started the
Cologne War (1582/83).
26Ending the Thirty Years' War, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) also ended princes' right to determine
the religion of their subjects|although the ius reformandi remained formally in place. A territory's o-
cial Church was guaranteed the right to publicly celebrate mass, etc. (exercitium publicum religionis), but
individuals were allowed to choose and privately practice another faith (devotio domestica). In contrast to
the Peace of Augsburg, the Peace of Westphalia did not only protect the Catholic and Lutheran denomina-
tions, but also Calvinists. Regarding disputes, the peace treaty stipulated the \normal year" 1624. That is,
territories should remain with the side that controlled them in January 1624.
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In creating a mapping between counties at the end of the Weimar Republic and the religion
of the princes who reigned over the corresponding areas in the aftermath of the Peace of
Augsburg, this paper relies on several historical accounts, in particular the regional histories
by Schindling and Ziegler (1992a,b, 1993a,b, 1995, 1996), which contain the most detailed
available information on the territories of the Holy Roman Empire for the period from 1500
to 1650.
The mapping created with this information is based on the religious situation around
1624|the \normal year" set in the Peace of Westphalia.27 Although there existed notable
dierences between and within dierent reformed faiths, as a whole the teachings of Luther-
ans, Calvinists, and Zwinglians were much closer to each other than to the doctrines of the
Catholic Church (Dixon 2002). The primary mapping, therefore, abstracts from dierences
between reformed denominations and dierentiates only between Protestant and Catholic
territories.
Only in a few instances does the area of a county correspond exactly to that of some state
at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Whenever Catholic and Protestant princes
reigned over dierent parts of a county, or whenever its area encompassed an Imperial City
or an ecclesiastical territory, the religion assigned to this county is the likely religion of
the majority of subjects. Since population estimates for the period are often not available,
relative populations are gauged by comparing the size of the areas in question (assuming
equal densities). In cases in which this procedure yields ambiguous results, the respective
counties are classied as neither \historically Protestant" nor \historically Catholic", but as
\mixed."28 Appendix B provides additional detail regarding the construction of the mapping.
4.2. First Stage and Reduced Form Results
Table 4 demonstrates that rulers' choices are indeed heavily correlated with the religion of
Germans living in the same areas over 300 years later. The estimates therein correspond to
the following econometric model:
(2) Catholicc = d + 0Historically Catholicc + 1Historically Mixedc +X
0
c+ c,
where Catholicc denotes county c's share of Catholics when the Nazis took power,Historically
27Since territories' ocial religions were not constant in the aftermath of the Peace of Augsburg, there
exists the possibility that the results depend on the choice of base year. To rule this out, a second mapping
based on the situation directly after the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 has been created. Both mappings are fairly
similar, but the situation in 1624 is a slightly better predictor of the geographic distribution of Protestants
and Catholics about 300 years later.
28This is the case for 10.1% of counties. Our results are robust to classifying these counties as either
Protestant or Catholic.
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Catholicc and Historically Mixedc are indicator variables for whether c is classied as \his-
torically Catholic" or \mixed," and Xc marks a comprehensive vector of controls, including
the factors that Cantoni (2012) and Rubin (2014) have shown to be correlated with the
spread of the Reformation movement. As before, we also add electoral district xed eects,
d.
Although the point estimates do decline with the inclusion of additional controls, espe-
cially latitude and electoral district xed eects, they remain economically large and statis-
tically highly signicant. Conditioning on the electoral district, we estimate that the share
of Catholics is almost 43 percentage points higher in counties governed by a Catholic ruler
than in those governed by a Protestant one. Similarly, historically mixed counties have a 22
percentage points higher share of Catholics.
Since rulers' choices introduce variation in the religion of Germans during the Weimar
Republic, one would also expect their choices to be correlated with Nazi vote shares if
Catholicism were, indeed, to have a causal eect. Table 5 explores this issue by estimating
the reduced form relationship:
(3) vc = d + 0Historically Catholicc + 1Historically Mixedc +X
0
c#+ &c.
According to the reduced form point estimates, the NSDAP received between 11.7 and 16.7
percentage points fewer votes in November of 1932 if the lord who ruled over a county's area
at the end of the sixteenth century chose to remain Catholic. By the same token, historically
mixed counties are estimated to have 5.6 to 8.1 percentage points lower Nazi vote shares.
One possible explanation for the ndings in Table 5 is that historically Protestant territo-
ries dier systematically from historically Catholic ones, above and beyond the factors for
which we already control. For instance, the former might have developed a dierent set of
institutions or developed a culture particularly receptive to the message of the NSDAP. In
such a case, the reduced form estimates might be driven by unobserved dierences.
However, the explanatory power of this argument appears a priori limited. At least since
the creation of a unied German Empire in 1871, possibly even since the Reichsdeputations-
hauptschluss in 1803, did formal institutions converge between traditionally Protestant and
Catholic areas. Moreover, Cantoni (2010) reports that there is no evidence for divergence in
economic prosperity between Protestant and Catholic cities.
Also, to the extent that institutions and culture are common to counties within the same
electoral district, one would expect estimates of the reduced form eect of religion to decline
considerably with the inclusion of electoral district xed eects. This is not the case. In
fact, estimates that condition on the electoral district are statistically indistinguishable from
18
those that do not.
4.3. Instrumental Variables Estimates
The preceding discussion established a relationship between princes' choices in the aftermath
of the Peace of Augsburg and the religion of Germans during the Weimar Republic, as well
as a correlation between princes' religion and NSDAP vote shares. It also appears that
observable county characteristics cannot explain the reduced form results. Taken together,
these ndings point to a causal eect of religion. In what follows, this eect is examined
more rigorously using the religion of a territorial lord as an instrumental variable (IV) for
counties' religious composition at the end of the Weimar Republic.
For territories' ocial religion in the aftermath of 1555 to be a valid instrument for that
of Germans living in the corresponding areas more than 300 years later, it must be the case
that princes' religion is uncorrelated with unobserved factors determining Nazi vote shares.
Unfortunately, this assumption is fundamentally untestable. The arguments in Section 4.1,
however, suggest that a territory's ocial religion stands a reasonable chance of satisfying
the exogeneity assumption required for a valid instrument, especially after controlling for all
variables known to have inuenced rulers' choices.
If one accepts this assumption, then instrumental variable estimates are consistent and
have a causal interpretation. The eect of Catholicism can then be estimated by two-stage
least squares (2SLS), treating counties' religious composition as endogenous and the variables
included in Xc as exogenous. That is, the estimating equation becomes
(4) vc = d +  \Catholicc +X 0c + "c,
where \Catholicc denotes the predicted share of Catholics based on the rst stage in equation
(2).
Results from our IV regressions are displayed in Table 6. As was the case for their OLS
counterparts, the impact of religion is estimated quite precisely. More importantly, it is
economically very large, and, if anything, it grows with the inclusion of additional controls.
Taken at face value, the 2SLS estimates suggest that in the last undoubtedly free election
Catholics were 27.5 percentage points less likely to vote for the Nazis than Protestants. The
results from our IV approach are, therefore, remarkably similar to the partial correlations
reported in Table 3.
Of course, for the point estimates in Table 6 to identify the causal eect of Catholicism
on Nazi vote shares, it must be the case that "c is uncorrelated with \Catholicc. That is,
princes' choice of religion must inuence NSDAP vote shares only through the religion of
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contemporary Germans. This is a fairly strong assumption, and it is not clear whether it
is, in fact, exactly satised. We, therefore, use Bayesian methods developed by Conley et
al. (2012) to assess the robustness of our results with respect to violations of the exclusion
restriction.
Specically, we consider the following econometric model:
(5) vc = d +Catholicc +X
0
c+ 0Historically Catholicc + 1Historically Mixedc + "c.
Here, the vector  = [0; 1] parameterizes the extent to which the exclusion restriction is
violated. If the exclusion restriction does, in fact, hold, then 0 = 1 = 0.
Since Catholicc is potentially endogenous,  and  cannot be separately identied. It is,
however, possible to identify  and conduct inference conditional on specifying the support
or the distribution of  (see Conley et al. 2012).
Figure 5 displays the results. The upper panel depicts the estimated eect of Catholicism if
one has no prior information on the sign or distribution of . As is apparent from the graph,
without information on the direction of the direct eect of rulers' choices in the aftermath
of 1555, one obtains identical point estimates as in the standard 2SLS setup. The condence
intervals, however, widen. The dotted line, labeled \Union," corresponds to the theoretical
95%-condence interval when we only impose the restriction that the support of  is equal
to [ ; ]  [ ; ]. Since Conley et al. (2012) show that the resulting condence intervals
are often too conservative (because they \overweight" highly unlikely cases, leading them to
include the true causal eect more than 95% of the time), we also explore assumptions that
rely on more prior information to produce ex ante correct coverage.
The dashed line depicts condence intervals under the assumption that  is distributed
uniformly on the interval [ ; ]  [ ; ]. That is,  still denotes the maximal allowable
violation of the exclusion restriction, but the econometrician believes all scenarios to be
equally likely. No matter how standard errors are ultimately calculated, as long as one is
willing to rule out direct eects larger than about 10 percentage points, one would still reject
the null hypothesis of no causal eect of religion.
In the lower panel of Figure 5 we explore the more \damning" case of prior information that
leads one to believe that rulers' choices themselves had a negative impact on NSDAP vote
shares. More specically, we impose the assumption that each element of  is distributed
uniformly on [ ; 0] and plot the resulting estimate of  as well as the 90%- and 95%-
condence intervals. While the size of the point estimates declines as we allow for potentially
larger violations of the exclusion restriction, they do remain economically meaningful for all
values of  that we consider. Moreover, the gure shows that one would not reject the null
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of no causal eect if one were only willing to rule out direct eects larger than about 12.5
percentage points.
To put this into perspective, 12.5 percentage points corresponds to almost one-half of all
NSDAP supporters (among eligible voters) in the November elections of 1932, or (taking
the point estimates in Table 3 at face value) to the estimated impact of moving almost
the entire workforce from agriculture into manufacturing, or to more than four times the
dierence between urban and rural counties. Whatever the true direct impact of princes'
choices in the sixteenth century on NSDAP vote shares may have been, we suspect that it
was smaller than that.
Remarkably, the point estimate corresponding to the case of  = :125 still implies that
Protestants were almost twice as likely to vote for the NSDAP as Catholics. Thus, even
after allowing for sizeable violations of the exclusion restriction, the evidence indicates that
Catholics were much less susceptible to the allure of the Nazis.
4.4. Additional Sensitivity and Robustness Checks
In the remainder of this section we conduct ancillary sensitivity and robustness checks in
order to demonstrate that our results do not depend on the choice of election, level of
aggregation, or the inclusion of particular regions of the Weimar Republic.
Table 7 contains the rst set of results. For each specication and each sample restriction,
we provide OLS point estimates based on equation (1) as well as 2SLS estimates based on
our IV approach in equation (4). The top row contains the baseline estimates from Tables
3 and 6. As the numbers in the remaining rows demonstrate, our results are quite robust
to the choice of regions included in the sample, the weighting scheme, whether we calculate
vote shares as a fraction of all eligible voters or only relative to valid votes cast, whether we
include even more detailed controls regarding the composition of the labor force and that of
the unemployed, and to controlling for Voigtlander and Voth's (2012) proxy for historically
rooted anti-Semitism, as well as the (endogenous) distribution of preferences over parties in
1920. We also show that the estimated eect remains essentially unchanged when we use
the religious situation directly after the Peace of Augsburg as an instrument (as opposed
to that at the eve of the Thirty Years' War). Moreover, our results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar if we replace the left-hand side variable with NSDAP vote shares in
the (free) election of July 1932 or with those in the (only partially free) election of March
1933. Only when relying on Nazi votes shares in 1930 do we obtain signicantly smaller point
estimates. Note, however, that only 14.8% of eligible voters chose the NSDAP in 1930. Thus,
the estimates remain economically very large.
Lastly, Table 8 shows that the results do not depend on the level of aggregation. Since
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municipality-level election results are not available for either of the two elections in 1932,
we focus on those in 1933 (upper panel) and 1930 (lower panel) instead|noting that only
the latter was fully free. Within each set of regressions, the leftmost column contains the
county-level baseline estimate. The middle column estimates the same model, but on the
municipality-level, while the last column adds county xed eects. That is, the rightmost
column uses only variation across villages within the same county for identication.
To be able to pursue our instrumental variables strategy while using county xed eects,
we have created an additional mapping that dierentiates as much as possible between
the religion of lords who ruled over dierent municipalities within the same counties. Since
counties in the Weimar Republic are, on average, fairly small|less than 190 square miles or
about the area of a square with 13.8 mile sides|and because there are fewer cases of princes
with dierent religions controlling villages within the same county, this last specication is
fairly demanding on the data (as evidenced by the low rst stage F-statistic). Nevertheless,
the results in Table 8 allow us to rule out that local idiosyncrasies or dierences in economic
conditions between Protestant and Catholic regions are driving our conclusions.
5. Conformity and Alternative Explanations
The ndings above suggest that Catholicism exerted a causal eect on NSDAP vote shares.
They are silent, however, on why Catholics were so much more resistant to the allure of the
Nazis than their Protestant counterparts.
In order to shed light on the causes of religious dierences in Nazi support, we rst provide
evidence on which parties Catholics voted for instead. The results in Table 9 are based on
our IV approach, i.e. equation (4), with the vote shares of other major parties serving as the
dependent variable. With the resulting point estimates in hand, we calculate vote shares by
religion.
To illustrate the mechanics of the exercise, let vp denote the national vote share of party
p, while letting vPp , v
C
p , v
O
p be the respective counterparts among Protestants, Catholics,
and \others." Since vote shares have been calculated as a fraction of all eligible voters, the
following identity must always hold:
(6) vp = sPv
P
p + sCv
C
p + (1  sP   sC) vOp ,
where sP and sC are the population shares of Protestants and Catholics, respectively. Note,
vp, sP , and sC are given in the raw data, and v
C
p = v
P
p +
b2SLS. Thus, if vOp were known, vote
shares of Catholics and Protestants would be exactly identied. As we do not have causal
estimates of vOp , we report two related statistics. First, we report estimates for v
P
p and v
C
p ,
assuming that vOp = vp, i.e. that \others" voted in the same way as the national average.
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Second, we provide bounds on vPp and v
C
p by letting v
O
p vary between 0 and 1. Given that the
population share of \others" is only about 4.6%, these bounds are fairly tight. Even more
importantly for our purposes, while the levels of vPp and v
C
p do vary with v
O
p , their dierence
will not.29
In line with much anecdotal evidence, our estimates imply that the electorate of the Zen-
trum was composed almost entirely of Catholics. Furthermore, until the very end of the
Weimar Republic, the fraction of Catholics voting for the Zentrum remained at over 40%,
down by some 10% from its peak in 1920. Compared to Catholics, Protestants were initially
much more likely to vote for the SPD, DDP, DVP as well as the right-wing DNVP. But with
the exception of the SPD, support for these parties dwindled dramatically after the onset of
the World Economic Crisis and the ensuing radicalization of the electorate.
Interestingly, there are no religious dierences in the far left of the political spectrum|
despite the Catholic Church's persistent warnings about the dangers of Socialism. That is,
Catholics and Protestants are estimated to have supported the communist KPD with equal
probability.
With respect to the far right, however, our results indicate meaningful dierences between
Protestants and Catholics as early as 1924, when Hitler was still imprisoned and the volkisch
movement had scattered across dierent parties. Although the share of Nazi voters grew
rapidly among both groups, Protestants were always at least two and a half|often three or
four|times as likely to vote for the Nazis as their Catholic counterparts.30
The patterns in Table 9 give rise to the following three questions: (i) Why were Catholics
so much more likely to vote for the Zentrum than for any other party? (ii) Why did Catholics
remain relatively loyal to the Zentrum, while Protestants abandoned their traditional parties
in much greater numbers and ocked toward the Nazis? (iii) Why were there important
religious dierences in Nazi vote shares|even very early on|but no dierences in support
for the Communists?
In this last part of the paper we argue that the inuence of the Catholic Church and its
dignitaries provides the most parsimonious answer to all of these questions. In support of
this assertion, we present additional empirical evidence.
29Strictly speaking, this holds only at interior solutions, i.e. when vPc and v
C
c lie within the unit interval.
Due to the linearity assumptions underlying the 2SLS estimates, implied vote shares are sometimes slightly
smaller than 0. In such cases we report max fv; 0g.
30As noted by Falter (1991), religious dierences in Nazi vote shares decline in March of 1933. As these
elections were not fully free, we are hesitant to interpret too much into the narrowing of the gap.
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5.1. Conformity and the Inuence of the Church
To structure the discussion we develop a simple model of voting decisions in the face of
pressure by the Church. Building on formal theories of conformity (e.g., Akerlof 1980 and
Bernheim 1994), we assume that there exists a social norm among Catholics (i.e. what it
means to a \good Catholic") that is dictated by the prescriptions of the Church and its
dignitaries. By contrast, Protestants act solely based on their own preferences|consistent
with the Protestant Church not taking an ocial stand.
More specically, let P = fA;B;C;D;E; Zg denote the set of political parties, with their
positions on the political spectrum given by the respective lowercase letters. All voters care
about parties' positions relative to their own continuously distributed bliss points t, i.e. their
type. Catholics and Protestants share the same distribution of types, but the former also
worry about adhering to the prescriptions set forth by the Church. That is, Protestants
derive utility g (x  t) from choosing party X, while that of Catholics is given by
(7) g (x  t)  1 [X 6= Z] .
The function g () is continuously dierentiable, strictly concave, and symmetric around its
maximum at 0. The key assumption is that Catholics suer a penalty  > 0 from supporting
a party other than Z, the Zentrum.
Bernheim (1994) provides a model of conformity in which such norms arise endogenously
because individuals care about how they are perceived by others. Here, we assume that
the Church is able to dictate the norm, i.e. it is exogenously given, but note that similar
conclusions would follow from a more general setup.
Since the Zentrum was perceived as the political arm of the Catholic Church and targeted
its messages towards Catholic voters, we also assume that Protestants did not consider
voting for it|consistent with the evidence in Table 9.31 When it comes to the remaining
parties, Protestants choose whichever one is positioned closest to their personal bliss point.
Catholics, however, must trade o political congruence with social stigma or \punishment"
by the Church. Thus, as long as  is strictly positive, some Catholics will vote for the Zentrum
despite the fact that another party is politically closer to their own ideal point. That is, the
set of types who will nd it optimal to vote for the Zentrum is a strict superset of those who
31It is straightforward to microfound this assumption, while retaining the qualitative predictions of the
model. For instance, with parties located suciently close to the Zentrum on either side of the political
spectrum, very few Protestants would vote for Z, while Catholics would continue to prefer the Zentrum.
Alternatively, Protestants might suer a penalty,  , from indirectly supporting the goals of the Catholic
Church. That is, their utility function could be written as g (x  t)   1 [X = Z]. If  is large enough, no
Protestant votes for the Zentrum. Since it is not the goal of this section to explain the lack of Protestant
support for the Zentrum, we abstract from these possibilities.
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would do so in the absence of pressure by the Church. To see this, consider a voter who is
equidistant from parties D and Z, i.e. jd  tj = jz   tj. Since  > 0, such a voter will end
up supporting Z. Continuity and strict concavity of g () then imply that the set of types
who vote for Z is strictly increasing in . Thus, if the social norm set forth by the Church
is suciently important relative to agents' own preferences, then the model above is able to
explain why Catholics overwhelmingly favored the Zentrum.
More importantly, the model is able to rationalize why there were always religious dif-
ferences in support of right-wing parties but not the communist KPD. Consider the upper
panels of Figure 6, which depict the model's predictions for the case of g =   (x  t)2,
x; t 2 [0; 1], and  = :09. Although there are no religious dierences in the distribution of
types, Catholics are initially less likely to vote for E, the party on the far right; but they
are equally likely to vote for party A, which is located at the opposite extreme of the spec-
trum.32 They key to this asymmetry is that the Zentrum was|despite its name|located
to the right of the political middle (see, e.g., Mommsen 1989, or Anderson 2000). Thus, for
intermediate levels of , some \right-wing types" will adhere to the norm and support the
Zentrum, but the inuence of the Church will not be enough to force \left-wing types" (who
are further away from Z) to conform. These types will vote for whichever party is closest to
them, regardless of whether they are Catholic or Protestant.
Clearly, the exact locations of the cuto points depend on parties' positions as well as
the specics of the parameterization, but it is straightforward to verify that this prediction
continues to go through as long as  is large but no too large relative to g () and as long as
the Zentrum is located to the right of the actual center.
As shown in the lower panels of Figure 6, our conformity theory is also able to rationalize
why Protestants ocked toward the Nazis (and to a lesser extent the Communists), while
Catholics remained relatively loyal to the Zentrum. Following much anecdotal evidence, we
model the World Economic Crisis and the ensuing radicalization of the electorate as bifurca-
tion of voters' preferences relative to the positions of parties.33 This produces an increase of
extremist parties' vote shares amongst Protestants and Catholics, but the continued pressure
of the Church limits the latter.
Thus, for intermediate values of , our model predicts a greater increase in NSDAP vote
32Note that for large enough values of , Catholics will not vote for any party located close to the Zentrum,
i.e. C and D. To explain the strictly positive vote shares of the DVP and DNVP, even among Catholics, it
suces to augment individuals' utility functions with an idiosyncratic, party-specic random shock.
33To achieve an increase in the vote share of extremist parties, one could also hold the distribution
of preferences xed while letting parties' positions move closer together. Since parties' positions are only
dened relative to the distribution of types, both assumptions are isomorphic. The historical record, however,
suggests that voters radicalized much more than parties, most of which moved somewhat to the right (see,
e.g., Childers 1983).
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shares among Protestants than among Catholics, but no religious dierences in the growth
of the left-wing KPD|despite the Church's strong anticommunist stand. The model's pre-
dictions are, therefore, fully consistent with the results in Table 9.34
Another a priori plausible rationalization of the ndings above might be that Catholics
and Protestants diered in the distribution of preferences and that the Zentrum party was
somehow better than other parties at catering to their core constituencies. While simple,
such an explanation has trouble rationalizing some of the results we present next.
In Table 10 we test our conformity theory by presenting empirical evidence on the model's
comparative statics. That is, we split our data according to dierent proxies for , the
parameter that governs the inuence of the Church, and estimate religious dierences in
NSDAP vote shares for each of the samples. If our theory is correct, we expect to see smaller
dierences in settings in which the Church and its dignitaries yielded less inuence over
Catholics.
For instance, one might think that the word of the Church carried more weight in rural
villages where the local priest knew all of his parishioners personally (and was able to mon-
itor their political activities) than in urban, more anonymous settings. Consistent with the
predictions of our theory, we estimate that in the November election of 1932 the religious
dierence in NSDAP vote shares was about 10{14 percentage smaller in cities than in rural
environments.
One might also expect that the Church's ocial political position was less credible and,
therefore, less inuential when it was directly contradicted by a local priest who openly
sympathized with the Nazis. We test this prediction using data on Catholic priests who are
known to have collaborated with the Nazis.
In a decade-long research project, Spicer (2008) collected the names and biographical
information of 138 Catholic priests (or ordained members of religious orders) who ocially
joined the NSDAP or made their Nazi convictions otherwise publicly known. We digitize this
information and say that a given village had a \brown priest" if one of the priests named in
Spicer (2008) resided within a 10 kilometer radius. Using municipality-level election results
for 1933, we nd that the religious dierence in NSDAP vote shares was at least 10 percentage
points smaller in villages where the local priest openly sympathized with the Nazis.35 Since
the data are unlikely to contain every single priest who spoke out in favor of the NSDAP,
34In light of the historical record, especially the quotes in Section 2, a similar, a priori reasonable model
would have been to assume that Catholics suered a penalty from abandoning the Zentrum but directly from
voting the NSDAP. Given parties' positions on the political spectrum, such a model would predict Catholics
to substitute from the NSDAP to DNVP. The results in Table 9, however, suggest that very few Catholics
voted for the DNVP.
35We obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results when using alternative radii of 5 or 15 kilo-
meters or when focusing on the 1930 elections instead.
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our estimates are likely to understate the true discrepancy.
Note that the preceding results cannot be readily explained by dierences in the distri-
bution of types across cities and rural villages or across municipalities with and without a
\brown priest." In the absence of pressure by the Catholic Church, shifts in the distribution
of preferences should have a similar eect on NSDAP vote shares among Protestants and
Catholics. Our results, however, demonstrate that the dierence between the two varies with
proxies for the inuence of the Church.
Moreover, Appendix Table A.2 shows that in 1924|when the NSDAP rst participated
in national elections|religious dierences in Nazi vote shares were equally large in villages
with and without a \brown priest" at the end of the Weimar Republic. That is, comparing
muncipalities that ended up having a \brown priest" in 1933 with those that did not, there
is no evidence of preexisting dierences in Catholics' support for the Nazis.
The nal piece of evidence comes from the Reichstag elections in 1920, when the NSDAP
still had only a few hundred members and was little more than a niche party in the Bavarian
capital of Munich. Following the practices of statisticians during the German Empire (e.g.,
Stolle 1893, among others), we calculate for each county the fraction of Catholics voting
for the Zentrum as the total number of Zentrum votes divided by the number of voting-
eligible Catholics. We then divide our sample into quartiles.36 Applying the model above to
the November elections in 1932, one would expect to see much smaller dierences between
Protestants and Catholics in areas in which the latter paid initially little attention to the
positions of the Church, i.e. in the lowest quartile. By contrast, there should be large dier-
ences wherever Catholics did conform, i.e. in the upper quartiles. These predictions conform
exactly to the ndings in the bottom half of Table 10. Although point estimates for the
\nonconformist" group of counties are not very precise, we can nevertheless rule out equal-
ity of coecients at the 1%-condence level. The predictions of our theory are, therefore,
consistent with these additional results.
Of course, the last piece of evidence can be equally well explained by the Zentrum being
more adept at retaining its initial followers than other parties. However, any theory focused
on the actions of the Zentrum (as opposed to those of the Catholic Church and its dignitaries)
would not only have to explain why the Zentrum was more successful at preventing defection
to the NSDAP than to the left-wing KPD, but it would also have to rationalize why religious
dierences in Nazi support were larger in rural villages than in urban environments, and why
the political leanings of the local priest should have had any eect on parishioners' votes.
36The population share of Catholics varies widely within these subsamples. For instance, Catholics make
up between .4 and 99.8 percent of the residents of counties in the lowest quartiles, while their share ranges
from .3 to 99.5 percent in the highest one.
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5.2. Testing Alternative Explanations
Peer Eects, Culture, and the Catholic Milieu Perhaps the most common explanation put
forth by scholars arguing for a causal eect of religion is that Catholics lived in a culturally
distinct environment, the Catholic milieu, which made them less susceptible to the messages
of political extremists (see, e.g., Burnham 1972; Falter 1991; Kuropka 2012; Lepsius 1966).
While it was undoubtedly true that life in predominantly Catholic regions was very dierent
from that in majoritarian Protestant ones, we question this explanation for three reasons.
First, given that the Catholic milieu is usually described as anti-Nazi and anti-Communist,
it cannot easily rationalize why there were no religious dierences in support for the commu-
nist KPD, while there were large dierences on the opposite end of the political spectrum.
Second, if social milieus were responsible for Catholics' relative immunity to the Nazis,
then the point estimates in Table 8 should decline markedly with the inclusion of county
xed eects. After all, cultural dierences were almost certainly smaller within than across
counties (which on average were no larger than a 14 by 14 mile square). Yet, our point
estimates remain quite stable.
One way to rectify this nding with an explanation based on dierent milieus would be to
argue that there are large cultural disparities even within counties. For instance, as long as
there is some critical mass, Catholics might be able to socialize mainly with other Catholics,
and it could be those \peer eects" that create a micromilieu which shields them from the
allure of the Nazis. In order to subject the milieu theory to a more rigorous test, we allow for
nonlinearities in the eect of religion on NSDAP vote shares by estimating semiparametric
versions of our baseline model in equation (1). More specically, we estimate the following
econometric model:
(8) vc = d + f (Catholicc) +X
0
c + "c.
By construction, the impact of religion, i.e. the analogue to  in equation (1), is now
given by the slope of f (), which we only restrict to be continuous. If social milieus or \peer
eects" really mattered for Catholics' voting decisions, then compared to \mixed" social
environments, the gap between Protestants and Catholics should be much wider when the
latter constitute the clear majority. That is, the relationship between Nazi vote shares and
a constituencies' religious composition should be highly nonlinear.
Figure 7 shows that this is not the case. The upper two panels are based on county-level
data for the elections in November 1932 (left) and those in March 1933 (right). The lower
panels use municipality-level data for 1933 instead, with the one on the right excluding all
villages and towns with more than two thousand inhabitants. Although estimates of f () are
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reasonably precise, one cannot reject the null hypothesis of a linear relationship in any of
the four plots. If anything, it appears that religious dierences in Nazi vote shares decrease
as the share of Catholics rises above 80%. There is, therefore, no evidence to conclude that
religious dierences in Nazi vote shares varied according to the social milieu.37
Viewed through the lense of a Berheim-type conformity model, it appears that the impor-
tance of the \norm", i.e. , does not vary with the religious composition of the population.
This nding is incompatible with an explanation emphasizing social mileus, but it does not
contradict our theory of elite inuence|at least if one believes that the Catholic Church
had ways to enforce its proscriptions even in \mixed" and predominantly Protestant areas.
Our third reason for dismissing explanations that hinge on social milieus is based on
the results of Satyanath et al. (2013). Contrary to the claims of Heilbronner (1998) and
others who emphasize the importance of close-knit social clubs and similar civic entities in
immunizing Catholics against the allure of the Nazis, Satyanath et al. (2013) show that the
NSDAP received higher vote shares in cities with more social capital, i.e. more of these
organizations.
Luther, the Kulturkampf, and Obedience to Worldly Authority Some early scholars, e.g.,
von Kuehnelt-Leddhin (1952), speculate that Hitler had greater appeal to Protestants be-
cause the Protestant Church had been traditionally very close to German rulers (as in the
epithet Thron und Altar). After all, in an attempt to make the Reformation more palatable
to princes, Martin Luther had taught obedience to secular rule|even if it was unjust|
whereas the Catholic Church was highly dismissive of worldly powers. Others have argued
that Bismarck's Kulturkampf with its persecutions of Church ocials sensitized Catholics
to the dangers of authoritarian regimes, and that it made them wary of the Hitler movement
very early on (e.g., Cremer 1999). Both hypotheses are testable.
If Catholics' experiences during the Kulturkampf had any impact on NSDAP vote shares,
then the eect should be larger in Prussia, where the Kulturkampf was considerably more
intense than in the remainder of the German Empire (Anderson 2000; Gross 2004). Similarly,
if Luther's teachings made Protestants more susceptible to the allure of the Nazis, then one
would expect to see smaller religious dierences in areas that are rooted in the Reformed
tradition of John Calvin, whose treatment of worldy authority diered sharply from that of
Luther (see, e.g., Hop 1991).
But again, Table 11 shows that neither of these predictions are borne out in the data. If
anything, religious dierences in NSDAP vote shares are greater in historically Calvinist than
Lutheran areas, and the point estimates for Prussia and the remainder of Weimar Germany
37OLS estimates that allow for  to vary with the religious composition of the electorate support this
assertion. That is, it is generally not possible to reject the null hypothesis of a constant eect.
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are statistically indistinguishable. Theories based on Catholics' wariness of secular authority
receive, therefore, no support.
Religiosity A priori one of the most natural explanations might have been that Catholics
were, on average, more pious, and that religiosity per se reduces the appeal of the \pagan"
Nazis. In order to test this explanation (despite its diculty in explaining the absence of
religious dierences in support for the antireligious KPD), we have gathered additional data
on Catholics' reception of the Easter Communion, church attendance throughout the year,
the number of religiously mixed marriages, christenings, etc. (see Amtliche Zentralstelle fur
kirchliche Statistik des katholischen Deutschlands 1924, 1931). We factor analyze these data
to extract a measure of religiosity (see the descriton in the Data Appendix) and divide our
sample into terciles.38 However, contrary to the predictions of this theory, we do not observe
smaller dierences between Protestants and Catholics when the latter are less religious. In
fact, the opposite appears to be true.
Religious Dierences in Human Capital Becker and Woessmann (2009) contend that Protes-
tantism had a causal eect on literacy rates in nineteenth century Prussia and that compared
to Catholics, Protestants in contemporary Germany still obtain about :8 additional years
of education. If correct, this argument does not necessarily invalidate our claim of a causal
eect of religion. It merely points to a dierent mechanism, i.e. the eect of religion on
NSDAP vote shares might have operated through education as opposed to the inuence of
the Church.
Although we do not possess direct measures of educational attainment in the Weimar
Republic, we would expect that the detailed occupational covariates in Table 7 (where we
control for the occupational composition of the work force by sector) account for at least
some, if not most, of the potential mean dierence between Protestants and Catholics. More-
over, we see no compelling theoretical reason for why the educated should have been more
susceptible to the allure of the Nazis. If anything, the historical record as well as the results in
Tables 3 and 6 suggest that relatively more educated white collar workers were less likely to
vote for the NSDAP than their less educated counterparts in agriculture. Lastly, without as-
signing a role to the Catholic Church and its dignitataries, an explanation based on religious
dierences in human capital acquisition cannot account for the fact that religious dierences
in Nazi vote shares depend on the politcal leanings of the local priest. It is, of course, possible
that lower education made Catholics more inclined to follow the prescriptions of the Church.
In sum, the evidence suggests that the eect of religion operated through the Catholic Church
38Reassuringly, our measure correlates positively with rates of church attendance and negatively with the
fraction of religiously mixed marriages as well as out-of-wedlock births. See Appendix B and Table A.3 for
details.
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leaning on believers to vote for the Zentrum Party, while the Protestant Church remained
politically neutral. None of the alternative explanations we consider are supported by the
data.
6. Concluding Remarks
Social scientists have long been interested in the role of elites in democratic transitions and
breakdowns. In this paper we study the role of the Catholic Church during the fall of the
Weimar Republic and Adolf Hitler's ensuing rise to power. Contrary to most of Germany's
traditional elites, the Catholic Church remained supportive of the new democracy|especially
the Zentrum Party|and took an explicit anti-Nazi position until March 1933.
To obtain the rst causal estimates we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the ge-
ographic distribution of Catholics and Protestants due to a peace treaty in the sixteenth
century. Even after allowing for sizeable violations of the exclusion restriction, our results
indicate that Catholics were signicantly less likely to vote for the NSDAP than Protestants.
Critically, religious dierences in NSDAP vote shares are smaller where, prior to the rise of
the Nazis, parishioners were less likely to follow the Church's \recommendation" to vote for
the Zentrum, and where a local priest contradicted the Church's ocial position by pub-
lically supporting the NSDAP. We argue that these as well as several other ndings are
most naturally rationalized by a model in which the Catholic Church leaned on believers
to vote for the Zentrum party, whereas the Protestant Church remained politically neutral.
Although the Catholic Church could not prevent the rise of the Nazis, our results suggest
that its ability to \steer" the masses yielded it considerable inuence in Germany's rst
democracy.
* * *
In March 1933, the German bishops reversed course and took a position favorable to Hitler.
Did ordinary Catholics follow their lead? Drawing on the data of Falter and Kater (1993) and
Voigtlander and Voth (2012), Table 12 presents some suggestive evidence based on several
proxy variables for anti-Semitism and Nazi ideology before and during the Third Reich.39
While Catholics were initially vastly underrepresented among members of the NSDAP and
despite the fact that predominantly Catholic cities had, if anything, fewer pogroms during
the 1920s, after the Church leadership abandoned its opposition to the Nazi government,
Catholics were somewhat more likely than Protestants to write letters to the editor of the
Nazi newspaper Der Sturmer, and cities with larger Catholic populations saw more depor-
39When using the data of Voigtlander and Voth (2012), we rely on their set of covariates and their ex-
tended sample. Results controlling for additional observable characteristics, even prefecture xed eects, are
qualitatively similar, but less precise. All other results in Table 12 are based on our OLS and IV specications
in equations (1) and (4), respectively, and use our standard set of controls.
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tations and more attacks on synagogues during the Reichskristallnacht.
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APPENDIX MATERIALS
Appendix A: Alternative Instrumental Variable Estimates
Becker and Woessmann (2009) as well as Cantoni (2010) propose distance to the city of Wittenberg|
the origin of the Reformation movement|as an instrument for Protestantism. While we explicitly
control for distance to Wittenberg in our main results, in this section we explore the implications
of using it as an alternative instrument. Although the distance to Wittenberg turns out to be a
weak instrument, our results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar when using it instead
of, or in combination with, territorial lords' religion.
Why should the distance to Wittenberg be a valid instrument? Becker and Woessmann (2009)
argue that the approximately concentric diusion of Protestantism around Wittenberg in Lutheran
times introduces exogenous variation in Protestantism in late-nineteenth-century Prussia. \The
main reasons for a circular dispersion around Wittenberg may have been the costs of traveling
and of information diusion through space, and these transportation and transaction costs played
a crucial role at the time. Electoral Saxony, the principality around Wittenberg, was an early
leader in implementing Luther's visions of reform [...]. This gives places closer to Wittenberg the
advantage of being able to observe the Reformation ideals put in practice and to more easily form
alliances of Protestant territories against Catholic powers. Furthermore, thousands of students
came to Wittenberg to hear Luther's sermons and speeches [...]" (Becker and Woessmann 2009,
pp. 557). Moreover, Becker and Woessmann (2009) present empirical evidence suggesting that
\distance to Wittenberg is indeed unrelated to a series of proxies for economic and educational
development before 1517, including the pre-Luther placement of schools, universities, monasteries,
and free imperial and Hanseatic cities and urbanization" (Becker and Woessmann 2009, pp. 532). If
the argument of Becker and Woessmann (2009) is, indeed, correct, and if it extends to the Weimar
Republic, then distance to Wittenberg constitutes an alternative instrumental variable to estimate
the causal impact of religion on Nazi vote shares.
Table A.1 displays the results. Columns (1){(2) present rst-stage estimates from the following
empirical model:
(A.1) Catholicc = d + Distance toWittenbergc +X
0
c+ c,
while the remaining columns show 2SLS results for the second stage, i.e.
(A.2) vc = d +  \Catholicc +X 0c + "c
with \Catholicc denoting the predicted share of Catholics based on the rst-stage equation above.
As in Becker and Woessmann (2009) as well as Cantoni (2010) distance to Wittenberg is heavily
correlated with counties' share of Catholics, although the correlation declines markedly once we
also include territorial lords' choices of religion. Importantly for our purposes, the 2SLS estimates
of the impact on Nazi vote shares in columns (4){(5) are qualitatively very similar to our main
results in Table 6. Taken at face value, the estimates in these columns imply that Protestants
were about three times as likely to vote for the NSDAP in the November election of 1932 as
their Catholic counterparts. This alternative instrumental variables strategy, therefore, supports
our main conclusions.
At the same time, it is important to point out that according to the critical values in Stock
and Yogo (2005) distance to Wittenberg is a weak instrument|at least in this particular setting.
Column (6) shows that this continues to hold when we inlcude higher order terms. Lastly, columns
(7) and (8) demonstrate that results from instrumenting with distance to Wittenberg and territorial
lords' choices of religion are quantitatively indistinguishable from those in the main text, and that
it is not possible to reject the overidentication test. That is, one cannot reject the null hypothesis
that instrumenting with distance to Wittenberg delivers the same estimate of the causal eect of
religion as using territorial lords' choices instead.
Appendix B: Data Appendix
This appendix provides a description of all data used in the paper, as well as precise denitions
together with the sources of all variables.
B.1. Election Results
Using ocial publications by the Statistische Reichsamt, Falter and Hanisch (1990) compile in-
formation on the ocial results of the Weimar Republic's parliamentary elections. Since this is
widely regarded as the most carefully constructed data set on the topic|taking, for instance, the
frequent redistricting into account|we rely on it as our primary source of information. For most
elections (i.e. for June 1920, May 1924, December 1924, May 1928, September 1930, and March
1933) results are available at the county as well as the municipality levels. Since the Statistische
Reichsamt released ocial numbers only for municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants, Falter
and Hanisch (1990) create \residual entities" called Restkreise, which pool all muncipalities in a
given county that have less than 2,000 residents (see Hanisch 1988 for additional details). We keep
these observations when conducting analyses at the municipality level.1 Unfortunately, the Statis-
tische Reichsamt never released municipality-level results for the last undoubtedly free elections
in July and November of 1932, which is why most of our empirical work is on the county level.
Throughout the analysis, the following variables are used:
Number of Eligible Voters is dened as the number of individuals residing in a given county or
municipality who had the right to vote. In order to derive representative estimates, we use, unless
otherwise noted, Number of Eligible Voters as the weighting variable in our regressions.
Major Parties' Vote Shares are dened as the number of votes cast for a particular party (i.e.
1In fact, the lower-right panel in Figure 7 is based on entirely on these observations.
KPD, SPD, DDP, Zentrum, DVP, DNVP, or NSDAP) over the number of eligible voters, not the
total number of valid votes. This lets us avoid issues of endogenous turnout. Vote shares for the
Zentrum always include those of the BVP, its Bavarian sister party. Note that the Nazis formed
an electoral alliance with other parties in the volkisch bloc for both elections in 1924, running as
NSFP in May 1924 and as NSFB in December 1924. For simplicitly we continue to use the label
\NSDAP." Also, in 1933 the DNVP campaigned together with the Stahlhelm and Landbund as
Kampront Schwarz-Wei-Rot. We use the label \DNVP."
Turnout is dened as the number of votes cast for all parties over the number of eligible voters.
B.2. Socioeconomic Characteristics
Data containing socioeconomic characteristics of counties and municipalities in the Weimar Re-
public come from Falter and Hanisch (1990). These data were transribed by Falter and Hanisch
(1990) from the 1925 and 1933 Censuses as well as other ocial publications by the Statistische
Reichsamt and the statistical oces of the Lander. While the data detailed below are almost al-
ways available at the county level, coverage of municipalities (especially smaller ones) varies due to
changes in the publication practices of the Statistische Reichsamt (see Hanisch 1988). To preserve
as much of the sample as possible, we supplement the data of Falter and Hanisch (1990) with hand-
coded information on the religious composition of counties from the 1933 Census. Unless otherwise
noted, our analysis restricts attention to the 982 counties with nonmissing information on religious
composition and election results in November 1932. This entails losing 3 counties due to missing
information on residents' religion. Below is a brief description of all variables used throughout the
paper. For additional details regarding the raw data, see Hanisch (1988).
Percent Catholic is dened as the number of Catholics living in a county (or municipality) as of
the 1925 Census divided by the county's population. For 22 counties we use information from the
1933 Census, as the data of Falter and Hanisch (1990) do not contain information on religious
composition.
Percent Protestant is dened as the number of Protestants living in a county (or municipality) as
of the 1925 Census divided by the county's population. For 22 counties we use information from
the 1933 Census, as the data of Falter and Hanisch (1990) do not contain information on religious
composition.
Percent Jewish is dened as the number of Jews living in a county (or municipality) as of the
1925 Census divided by the county's population. For 22 counties we use information from the
1933 Census, as the data of Falter and Hanisch (1990) do not contain information on religious
composition.
Percent Nonreligious is dened as as the residual category, i.e. the share of a county's (or munici-
pality's) population that is not classied as either Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish.
Percent Female is dened as the number of women living in a county (or municipality) as of the
1933 Census divided by the county's total population.
Urban County is an indicator variable equal to one if a county (or municipality) is ocially classied
as Stadtkreis.
Rural County is an indicator variable equal to one if a county (or municipality) is not ocially
classied as Stadtkreis.
Population denotes the number of individuals residing within a county (or municipality), as reported
in the 1925 Census (in 1,000s). And Log Population is dened as its natural logarithm.
Female Labor Force Participation Rate is dened as the share of females whom the 1933 Census
includes in the labor force.
Unemployment Rate is dened as the percentage of labor force particpants who are out of work, as
reported in the 1933 Census.
Percent in Agriculture is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants who work
in agriculture or forestry (Land- und Forstwirtschaft), as reported in the 1933 Census. In our
regressions, Percent in Agriculture serves as the omitted category for Sectoral Composition of the
Workforce.
Percent in Manufacturing and Artisanry is dened as the percentage of employed labor force
particpants who work in manufacturing and artisanry (Industrie und Handwerk), as reported in
the 1933 Census.
Percent in Trade and Commerce is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants
who work in trade and commerce (Handel und Verkehr), as reported in the 1933 Census.
Percent in Services is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants who work in
the public or private service sectors (oentlicher Dienst und private Dienste), as reported in the
1933 Census.
Percent in Domestic Labor is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants who
perform domestic services (hausliche Dienste), as reported in the 1933 Census.
Percent Helping Family Members is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants
who work in their family's business or on the family farm (mithelfende Familienangehorige), as
reported in the 1933 Census.
Percent White Collar Workers is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants who
are reported as Angestellte in the 1933 Census.
Percent Civil Servants is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants who are
reported to be civil servants (Beamte) in the 1933 Census.
Percent Blue Collar Workers is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants who
are reported as Arbeiter in the 1933 Census.
Percent Domestic Servants is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants who
are reported to be domestic servants (Hausangestellte) in the 1933 Census.
Percent Self-Employed is dened as the percentage of employed labor force particpants who are
reported to be self-employed (Selbststandige) in the 1933 Census.
Additional Labor Force Controls are taken from the 1925 Census. The 1925 Census lists the number
of individuals in a specic sector and occupation. That is, it includes the number of self-employed in
agriculture, in industry and artisanry, in the service sector, and in domestic labor. Similarly, it lists
the number of helping family members, civil servants, and white collar workers as well as blue collar
workers in each of these sectors. For each sector-occupation-cell, we calculate the corresponding
percentage among all employed labor force participants and use the resulting variables as additional
controls in Table 7.
White Collar Workers Among Unemployed is dened as the percentage of unemployed labor force
particpants who are reported to be Angestellte in the 1933 Census.
Blue Collar Workers Among Unemployed is dened as the percentage of unemployed labor force
particpants who are reported to be Arbeiter in the 1933 Census.
Domestic Servants Among Unemployed is dened as the percentage of unemployed labor force
particpants who are reported to be domestic servants (Hausangestellte) in the 1933 Census.
Fraction of Catholics Voting for the Zentrum Party in 1920 is dened as the share of votes that
the Zentrum obtained in a given county during the 1920 parliamentary elections divided by the
share of Catholics among that county's residents.
Catholic Heartland is dened as the regions of Rhineland, Westphalia, Baden, as well as South-East
Bavaria.
Catholic Diaspora is deend as the complement to Catholic Heartland, i.e. the remainder of Ger-
many.
B.3. Territories' Ocial Religion after the Peace of Augsburg
In creating a mapping between counties at the end of the Weimar Republic and the religion of the
prince who reigned over the corresponding area in the aftermath of the Peace of Augsburg, this
paper relies on several historical accounts (e.g., Dixon 2002; Lutz 1997; among others).2 The pri-
mary source of information, however, are the regional histories by Schindling and Ziegler (1992a,b,
1993a,b, 1995, 1996), which summarize the available research on each of the territories of the Holy
2Spenkuch (2011) uses the same approach to create a mapping between counties in contemporary Germany
and the religion of the respective territorial lord at the eve of the Thirty Years' War.
Roman Empire for the period from 1500 to 1650. While the work of Schindling and Ziegler (1992a,b,
1993a,b, 1995, 1996) is based on a comprehensive body of historical research, the Reformation pe-
riod has been studied more extensively for some regions than others. Consequently, information on
some small independent territories, such as Isenburg, Hoya, or Barby, is relatively scarce.
The primary mapping used in this paper is based on the religious situation around 1624|the
\normal year" for territories' ocial religion set in the Peace of Westphalia, which ended princes'
inuence over the religion of their subjects. Since territories' ocial religion was not constant from
1555 until 1624, there exists the possibility that the results depend on the choice of base year. To
mitigate this possibility a secondary mapping based on the situation directly after the Peace of
Augsburg in 1555 has been created as well. The robustness checks in Table 7 show that our results
are robust to using this alternative mapping instead.
Despite notable dierences between and within dierent Protestant denominations, i.e. Lutherans,
Calvinists, and Zwinglians, as a whole their teachings were much closer to each other than to the
doctrines of the Catholic Church. Thus, our primary mapping dierentiates only between Protestant
and Catholic regions. Another reason is that during the Second Reformation a number of territorial
lords converted from Protestantism to Calvinism, but did not require their subjects to adopt their
new religion. That is, most subjects remained Protestant. We have also created an ancillary mapping
that dierentiates between regions in which subjects remained Protestant and those in which they
were forced to convert to Protestantism. This mapping is used in Table 11, when we split our
sample by the historical religion of people in the area.
In only a few instances does the area of a county or county equivalent at the end of the Weimar
Republic correspond exactly to the area of some state at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Moreover, until the secularization in 1803 abbots and bishops were not only religious but also
worldly rulers in the Holy Roman Empire. This entails that a handful of cities were divided between
a religious and a worldly lord. Multiple rulers make it, of course, more dicult to determine an
\ocial religion," and necessitate the use of guidelines by which to assign a religion to the county
corresponding to a given area.
Whenever Catholic and Protestant lords reigned simultaneously over dierent parts of a county's
area, or whenever this area contained an Imperial City, the religion assigned to this county corre-
sponds to the likely religion of the majority of subjects. While Imperial Cities were not bound by
princes' ius reformandi, political power in these towns often lay in the hands of local elites who
would virtually impose the Reformation on residents (Dixon 2002). While the mapping is in a strict
sense based on the likely religion of the majority of subjects in a given area, most variation comes
from the fact that princes or local elites could dictate the religion of ordinary people.
A complicating factor is that population estimates are often not available for this time period. In
cases in which relative populations cannot be determined with certainty, they are gauged by com-
paring the size of the areas in question assuming equal population densities. For 10% of counties
this procedure yielded ambiguous results. The counties in question are classied as neither \histor-
ically Protestant" nor \historically Catholic," but as \mixed." Our results are robust to classifying
all of these counties as either historically Protestant or historically Catholic.
Absent reliable high-resolution GIS data for the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,
the mappings described above had to be constructed by visually comparing the borders of counties
(as of the end of 1932) with the principalities in the maps of Schindling and Ziegler (1992a,b,
1993a,b, 1995, 1996). Naturally, the information in their verbal description was used as well, and
proved often much more useful than any map|especially when a territory's ocial religion changed
multiple times. Given that names of cities and places vary little over time, it was feasible to relate
whole text passages to modern-day areas and counties.
For Table 8 we have created an additional mapping that takes (as much as possible given the
level of detail in Schindling and Ziegler 1992a,b, 1993a,b, 1995, 1996 and other sources) dierences
within counties into account. That is, the mapping used in the municpality level specications in
Table 8 assigns dierent historical religions to villages within the same county whenever princes
with dierent religions are known to have controlled these villages.
The process of gathering and analyzing the historical information, as well as the creation of the
mapping itself, was carried out by a German research assistant, who holds the equivalent of a
graduate degree in history.
B.4. Geographical Control Variables
We geocode the centroid of each county in our data using ArcGIS. We also geocode the location of
each municipality with help of an automated script to query Google Maps. In cases in which our
script delivers no or ambigious results|as, for instance, the name of a village might have changed
over time, or because Google Maps is unable to distinguish two villages with the same name|we
determine the location of a municipality using all available information in the raw data, such as
the county in which it is located, population, etc., coupled with other public sources and hand-code
latitude and longitude. With these geocodes in hand, we then calculate the following geographical
control variables.
Latitude is the north-south position in degrees north.
Longitude is the east-west position in degrees east.
Distance to Berlin denotes the linear distance (in kilometers) to the city of Berlin.
Distance to Major City denotes the linear distance (in kilometers) to the nearest of the Weimar
Republic's ten largest cities, i.e. Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Munich, Leipzig, Dresden, Breslau,
Essen, Frankfurt, and Dusseldorf.
Distance to Border denotes the linear distance (in kilometers) to the nearest border of the Weimar
Republic.
Distance to Major Port denotes the county's / municiaplity's linear distance (in kilometers) to the
nearest important port, i.e. Bremen, Emden, Hamburg, Wilhemlshaven, Rostock, Kiel, Wismar,
Lubeck, and Flensburg.
Distance to Major River denotes the linear distance (in kilometers) to the nearest major navigable
river, i.e. Rhine, Main, Mosel, Neckar, Danube, Fulda, Werra, Weser, Elbe, Saale, Havel, Oder,
Ems, Wista, and Warta.
Distance to Ore or Coal Deposits denotes the linear distance (in kilometers) to the nearest of the
following deposits of ore or coal: Lower Rhine Embayment, Lausatia, Bitterfeld, Upper Palatinate,
Bergheim, Borken, Aachen, Freital, Ibbenburen, Zwickau, Ruhr Area, Saarlouis.
B.5. Historical Control Variables
In order to account for as many potential confounds as possible, our empirical work explicitly
controls for the variables that Cantoni (2012) and Rubin (2014) have shown to have had an eect
on territorial lords' choice of religion. In mapping information on the territories in Cantoni (2012)
onto counties in the Weimar Republic, we use the same approach as in constructing our mapping
of counties' historical religion (see Section B.3). Merging the data of Rubin (2014) with our main
data set is more straightforward. We associate each city in Rubin's data with the county in which
it lies as of the November elections of 1932. Below is a brief description of all historical controls
used throughout the analysis.
Distance to Wittenberg denotes the linear distance (in kilometers) to the small city of Wittenberg|
the origin of the Reformation movement. This variable is calculated based on the latitude and
longitude of each county (as explained in Section B.4).
Ecclesiastical Status is an indicator variable equal to one if the data of Cantoni (2012) indicate
that a prince-bishop or another clergyman ruled over the area corresponding to a given county.
Contribution to Reichsmatrikel denotes the contribution to the Imperial War Tax (Reichsmatrikel)
averaged over the princes who governed over the area corresponding to a given county. The data
used to construct this variable come from Cantoni (2012).
Printing Press is an indicator variable equal to one if the data of Rubin (2014) indicate that at least
one of the cities in a given county had a printing press at the beginning of the sixteenth century.
As part of our set of geographical covariates we also control for latitude, which Cantoni (2012)
shows to be an important predictor for the adoption of Protestantism.
B.6. Information on \Brown Priests"
Our data on \brown priests" come from Spicer (2008). In a decade-long research project, Spicer
(2008) collected the names and biographical information of 138 Catholic priests (or ordained mem-
bers of religious orders) who ocially joined the NSDAP or made their Nazi convictions otherwise
publicly known, i.e. by speaking at party meetings, blessing SA cadres, etc. A typical entry reads:
Schurmeister, Wilhelm
born Munich, December 21, 1899
ordained May 30, 1926 (Munich)
Kooperator, Fresing St. Georg, July, 1926 (supports NSDAP through his pastoral ministry)
Expositus, Grobenzell, September 16, 1936
Pfarrkurat, Grobenzell, February 1, 1938
date of death unkown
Source: ALMU Studenten-Karte, EAM NL Faulhaber 5402, Schematismus Munchen.
(Spicer 2008, p. 290)
We digitize this information, in particular where these priests resided at the time of each of the
Weimar Republic's elections (assuming that they remained in the last known locality until a new
one is listed in the description of Spicer 2008). We then geocode the location of each priest using
an automated script to query Google Maps. In cases in which the script delivers no or ambigious
results|as, for instance, Google Maps is unable to distinguish two villages with the same name|
we determine the location of a priest using all available information in the description of Spicer
(2008) coupled with other public sources and hand-code latitude and longitude. With the geocodes
in hand, we say that a given village had a \brown priest" if one of the priests named in Spicer
(2008) resided within a 10 kilometer radius at the time of the election.
B.7. Measures of Religiosity
In order to test explanations based on Catholics' piety, we have gathered additional data on
Catholics' reception of the Easter Communion, church attendance throughout the year, the num-
ber of mixed marriages, christenings, etc. The sources of these data are Amtliche Zentralstelle fur
kirchliche Statistik des katholischen Deutschlands (1924) and Amtliche Zentralstelle fur kirchliche
Statistik des katholischen Deutschlands (1931). We factor analyze the variables described below to
extract a measure of religiosity and divide our sample of counties into terciles.
Easter Communion is dened as the share of Catholics who satised their Easter Duty, i.e. who
received the Holy Eucharist at least once during the Easter season. To construct this variable we
devide the number of Catholics who satised their Easter Duty in 1929 by the total number of
Catholics in the same year. Both variables come from Amtliche Zentralstelle fur kirchliche Statistik
des katholischen Deutschlands (1931) and are available at the level of the diocese. We match counties
with diocese by electronically mapping the centroids of the former into the boundaries of the latter.
Mass Attendance is dened as the share of Catholics who (regularly) attend Sunday Mass. To
construct this variable we devide the number of Catholics who did so in 1929 by the total number of
Catholics in the same year. Both variables come from Amtliche Zentralstelle fur kirchliche Statistik
des katholischen Deutschlands (1931) and are available at the level of the diocese. We match counties
with diocese by electronically mapping the centroids of the former into the boundaries of the latter.
Mixed Marriages is dened as the number of times a Catholic married someone of another faith in
1923 divided by the total number of marriages in the same year. Both variables come from Amtliche
Zentralstelle fur kirchliche Statistik des katholischen Deutschlands (1924) and are available at the
state level, with Prussia subdivided into provinces. We match counties with states/provinces by
electronically mapping the centroids of the former into the boundaries of the latter.
Babies from Mixed Marriages is dened as the number of babies born in 1923 to a couple in
which only one parent was Catholic divided by the total number of births to Catholics in the same
year. Both variables come from Amtliche Zentralstelle fur kirchliche Statistik des katholischen
Deutschlands (1924) and are available at the state level, with Prussia subdivided into provinces.
We match counties with states/provinces by electronically mapping the centroids of the former into
the boundaries of the latter.
Out-of-Wedlock Births is dened as the number of babies born in 1923 to a single Catholic mother
divided by the total number of births to Catholics in the same year. Both variables come from
Amtliche Zentralstelle fur kirchliche Statistik des katholischen Deutschlands (1924) and are available
at the state level, with Prussia subdivided into provinces. We match counties with states/provinces
by electronically mapping the centroids of the former into the boundaries of the latter.
Christenings is dened as the number of babies christened in 1923 divided by the total number of
births to Catholics in the same year. Both variables come from Amtliche Zentralstelle fur kirchliche
Statistik des katholischen Deutschlands (1924) and are available at the state level, with Prussia
subdivided into provinces. We match counties with states/provinces by electronically mapping the
centroids of the former into the boundaries of the latter.
Church Burials is dened as the number of Catholics who received a church burial in 1923 divided
by the total number of Catholics who died in the same year. Both variables come from Amtliche
Zentralstelle fur kirchliche Statistik des katholischen Deutschlands (1924) and are available at the
state level, with Prussia subdivided into provinces. We match counties with states/provinces by
electronically mapping the centroids of the former into the boundaries of the latter.
We factor analyze the variables described above to extract a measure of religiosity. This measure, i.e.
the rst factor (which has an eigenvalue of 4.75), explains 79.6% of the variance in the underlying
components.
Table A.3 displays the factor loadings for the rst four factors (i.e. those with positive eigenval-
ues). As one would expect, our measure of religiosity correlates positively with Mass Attendance,
Easter Communion, Christenings, and Church Burrials; and it is negatively correlated with Mixed
Marriages, Babies from Mixed Marriages, as well as Out-of-Wedlock Births. Moreover, the same
table shows that the remaining, unexplained variation in each of these variables is fairly low.
B.8. NSDAP Membership Data
Our data on NSDAP membership come from Falter and Kater (1993). Together with W. Burstein,
Falter supervised members of the Arbeitsbereich Faschismusforschung at the Free University of
Berlin and of the Department of Sociology at the University of Minnesota, who randomly sampled
42,018 membership cards for individuals who had at some point joined the Nazi Party before
1933/34. The sampling universe were the two original masterles of the NSDAP, containing a total
of about 11:6 million membership cards, then stored at the Berlin Document Center (see Scheider-
Haase 1991 for for a detailed description of the sampling procedures and for a comparison with
other membership data).
Restricting attention to those who had joined the Nazi Party before 1933, we geocode the location
of each member (based on the Ortsgruppe) using an automated script to query Google Maps. In
cases in which our script delivers no or ambigious results|as, for instance, the name of a village
might have changed over time, or because Google Maps is unable to distinguish two villages with
the same name|we determine the location of an Ortsgruppe using all available information in
the raw data (primarily the Gau) coupled with other public sources and hand-code latitude and
longitude. This lets us geocode the location of about 98.4% of observations in the raw data. With
the geocodes in hand, we sum across all cities and villages within a county in order to determine the
number of NSDAP members as of December 1932. Since it is often dicult to determine whether
a suburb was part of a city and, therefore, part of a Stadtkreis in 1932, we include all Stadtkreise
with the county that surrounds them, which leaves us with 712 \aggregated counties." To obtain
an estimate of NSDAP membership rates, we divide by the \aggregated county's" adult population
and inate the resulting number by 33:33.3 The NSDAP membership rate then serves as one of
the dependent variables in Table 12, the results in which refer to the coecients on Share Catholic
from estimating our OLS and IV specications, i.e. equations (1) and (4).
B.9. Data of Voigtlander and Voth (2012)
Information on historically rooted anti-Semitism, pogroms during the 1920s, attacks on synagogues
during the Reichskristallnacht, letters to the editor of the Nazi newspaper Der Sturmer, and the
number of deportations come from the city-level data set of Voigtlander and Voth (2012). Whenever
using one of their proxies for Nazi ideology as an outcome variable, we employ their original set
of covariates, i.e. cities' religious composition, an indicator variable for whether a city experienced
pogroms during the Black Death (1348{50), and log population, but use their extended sample to
preserve as much information as possible.
Relying on Alicke (2008), Voigtlander and Voth (2012) collect information on all municipalities
within the 1938 borders of Germany that have twentieth-century data on Jewish settlements and
on at least one of their anti-Semitic outcome variables. This procedure yields a sample of 1,427
towns. As there exists direct evidence of fourteenth-century Jewish settlements for only 325 of these
cities, Voigtlander and Voth (2012) restrict attention to this subset. For our purposes it is irrelevant
3At the end of 1932 the NSDAP is believed to have had about 1.2 million members, while the data of
Falter and Kater (1993) contain approximately 36,000 individuals who joined the party before January 1933
and who have a valid entry for Ortsgruppe. This results in a sampling factor of about 33:33.
whether a given city had a Jewish settlement in the fourteenth century, which is why we rely on
their extended sample.
Below are brief denitions of all of their variables we use throughout the paper. For more-detailed
descriptions, see Voigtlander and Voth (2012), especially their Data Appendix.
Historical Anti-Semitism is an indicator variable equal to one if at least one city in a given county
experienced pogroms of Jews during the Black Death (1348-50). Voigtlander and Voth (2012)
construct this variable based on the Germania Judaica from Avneri (1968). We take this variable
from Voigtlander and Voth (2012) and use it as an additional control in one of the specications
in Table 7.
Pogroms during the 1920s is an indicator varibale equal to one if Alicke (2008) reports that a violent
outrage involving physical violence occured against a city's Jewish population during the 1920s. If
Alicke (2008) mentions no outrage or no physical violence, it takes on a value of zero. We take this
variable directly from Voigtlander and Voth (2012) and use it as one of the outcomes in Table 12.
Letters to Der Sturmer denotes the number of letters to the editor of the Nazi newspaper Der
Sturmer that were written by residents of a locality in the data set of Alicke (2008) and published
between 1935 and 1938. To ensure comparability across municipalities, the variable is scaled by
population in 1933. Voigtlander and Voth (2012) construct the variable by counting the number of
letters that (i) were published as articles, (ii) denounced individuals as interacting/doing business
with Jews, or (iii) asked questions about Jews (such as \How many Jews live in town X?"). We
take this variable directly from Voigtlander and Voth (2012) and use it as one of the outcomes in
Table 12.
Attacks on Synagogues During the Reichskristallnacht is an indicator variable equal to one if a
city's synagogue was in use in 1933 and either destroyed or damaged during the \Night of Broken
Glass" in 1938. Destruction is said to have occurred if the synagogue was ravaged to at least the
point where it became unusable, whereas damage is dened to have taken place if some of the
synagogues inventory was broken or if the building was impaired but remained usable. Voigtlander
and Voth (2012) transcribe this information from Alicke (2008). We take the variable directly from
Voigtlander and Voth (2012) and use it as one of the outcomes in Table 12.
Deportations is the number of deportations of a city's Jewish (or presumably Jewish) residents
recorded in the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv 2007) scaled by the city's Jewish population
in 1933. Voigtlander and Voth (2012) construct this variable by searching the second (and improved)
version of the database for each town in their data set, recording the number of deportees for the
years 1933{1945. We take the variable directly from Voigtlander and Voth (2012) and use it as one
of the outcomes in Table 12.
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Figure 1: Election Results in Weimar Germany, January 1919 – March 1933
Notes: Figure depicts vote shares of major parties in each election to the Reichstag (1920–1933) and 
Nationalversammlung (1919). Asterisks mark years in which the NSDAP was officially outlawed. In 
these years the Nazis formed an electoral alliance with other parties in the völkisch  bloc, running as 
NSFP in May 1924 and as NSFB in December 1924. Results for the Zentrum include the BVP.
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Figure 2: Religion and Nazi Vote Shares
A. Geographic Distribution of Protestants and Catholics
B. Geographic Distribution of the Nazi Vote, November 1932
Sources:  Based on Kunz (1996) and the information in Schindling and 
Ziegler (1992a,b, 1993a,b, 1995, 1996). See also Spenkuch (2011).
Figure 3: Religion in the Holy Roman Empire Before the Thirty Years' War
Figure 4: Assessing the Potential Impact of Omitted Variables Bias
Notes: Figure depicts the identified set for the causal effect of religion on NSDAP vote 
shares in the November election of 1932, given different assumptions about ψ, the 
coefficient of proportionality in Oster (2013). Intuitively, ψ bounds how correlated 
unobserved covariates may be with the independet variable of interest, relative to those 
included in the regression, i.e. X  in equation (1). The shaded region, thefore, includes 
all values of β that are consistent with a coefficient of proportionality between 0 and ψ. 
The bounds are derived for a maximal R² of 1. See the description in the main text or 
Oster (2013) for additional detail.
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 A. 95%-Confidence Interval Estimates with Mean-Zero Prior
Notes: Figure depicts point estimates as well as 90% (dotted line) and 95% (dashed 
line) confidence intervals for the effect of Catholicism on NSDAP vote shares in 
the November elections of 1932. Estimates are based on the assumption that each 
element of γ in equation (6) is distributed U(-δ,0). See the main text as well as 
Conley et al. (2012) for details on the estimation procedure.
Notes: Figure depicts point estimates and 95%-confidence intervals for the effect of 
Catholicism on NSDAP vote shares in the November elections of 1932. The 
intervals labeled "Union" impose only the prior information that the support of γ in 
equation (6) is [-δ,δ]×[-δ,δ]. Intervals labeled "Uniform Prior" are based on the 
assumption that each element of γ is distributed U(-δ,δ). The solid line shows the 
respective point estimate. See the main text as well as Conley et al. (2012) for 
details on the estimation procedure. 
B. 90%- and 95%-Confidence Interval Estimates with Negative Prior
Figure 5: Inference Allowing for Violations of the Exclusion Restriction
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Notes: Graphs depict the predictions of the conformity model in Section V for the following parameterization: 
g=-(x-t)² , x,t∈[0,1] , and λ=.09 . Parties' positions equal a=.1 , b=.4 , c=.5 , d=.65 , e=.87 , and z=.6 .
Figure 6: Predictions of a Non-Stochastic Conformity Model
A. Protestants, 1924 B. Catholics, 1924
C. Protestants, 1932 D. Catholics, 1932
Figure 7: Semiparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Religion and Nazi Vote Shares
Notes: Graphs show semiparametric estimates of the relationship between NSDAP vote shares and voters' religion, i.e. f(∙) 
in equation (8), as well as the associated asymptotic 95%-confidence intervals. The upper two panels are based on county-
level data, whereas the one on the bottom left relies on municipality-level data instead. The panel on the bottom right uses 
only data on geographic units, which include no municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants. See the Data Appendix 
for a detailed description of the data. f(∙)  is estimated according to the differencing method in Yatchew (1998). Standard 
errors account for clustering at the electoral district and have been caclulated using the block bootstrap with 1,000 
iterations.
A. November 1932, County Level B. March 1933, County Level
C. March 1933, Municpality Level D. March 1933, Excluding Municipalities > 2,000 Population
Years of Crisis:
1918 November Revolution & proclamation of the German Republic
1919 January Spartacus uprising; Elections to the National Assembly
June Treaty of Versailles
August Constition of Weimar signed into law
1920 March / April Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch; Communist uprisings
June Elections to the first Reichstag
1921 – 1922 Political assisinations of M. Erzberger and W. Rathenau, among others
1923 January Allied Rhineland occupation
November Beer Hall Putsch; Introduction of Rentenmark to end hyperinflation
Golden Era:
1924 August Dawes Plan
1925 April Ultra-conservative P. v. Hindenburg elected Reichspresident
October Treaty of Locarno
1926 September Germany admitted to League of Nations
Decline and Downfall:
1929 October Stock market crash & beginning of economic crisis
December Young Plan & Referendum on "Law Against the Enslavement of the German People"
1930 March H. Brüning appointed Chancellor, first "presidential cabinet" governs by emergency decree
Septmeber Parliamentary elections: radical parties experience massive gains
1932 April P. v. Hindeburg reelected as Reichspresident; A. Hitler gets 36.8% of votes
June / July F. v. Papen appointed new Chancellor; Nazis gain further ground in parlimanetary elections
November NSDAP experinces first setback in parliamentary elections
December General v. Schleicher appointed new Chancellor
1993 January A. Hitler appointed new Chancellor
February Reichstag Fire; Weimar Constitution suspended indefinitely 
March NSDAP achieves 43.9% of popular vote in parliamentary elections; passage of Enabling Act
Table 1: Key Events in the Fall of the Weimar Republic
Sources:  Based in part on the description in Mommsen (1989).
Variable Full Sample Catholic Protestant
NSDAP Vote Share (in %):
May 1924* 5.181 3.837 5.663
(4.765) (4.935) (4.611)
December 1924* 2.384 1.426 2.727
(2.528) (1.943) (2.624)
May 1928 2.025 1.803 2.106
(2.242) (2.165) (2.265)
September 1930 14.80 10.40 16.46
(6.04) (4.66) (5.66)
July 1932 30.99 19.66 35.28
(11.07) (6.37) (9.31)
November 1932 26.42 16.65 30.06
(9.99) (5.93) (8.66)
March 1933 38.65 30.74 41.62
(10.00) (6.87) (9.36)
Religion of Majority
Table 2A: NSDAP Vote Shares by Religion, 1924–1933
Notes:  Entries are population-weighted means and standard deviations of county-level 
NSDAP vote shares (calculated as percentage of all eligible voters) for those counties 
with nonmissing information on religous composition. Asterisks (*) mark years in 
which the NSDAP was officially outlawed. In these years the Nazis formed an electoral 
alliance with other parties in the völkisch  bloc, running as NSFP in May 1924 and as 
NSFB in December 1924.  See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source 
of each variable.
Variable Full Sample Catholic Protestant Source
Demographics:
Percent Catholic 31.28 81.21 12.65 1925 Census
(33.40) (14.60) (13.21)
Percent Protestant 64.12 16.74 81.79 1925 Census
(32.03) (13.32) (13.87)
Percent Jewish .97 .69 1.07 1925 Census
(1.60) (.68) (1.82)
Percent Nonreligious 3.64 1.36 4.49 1925 Census
(3.47) (1.65) (3.58)
Percent Female 51.29 51.26 51.30 1933 Census
(1.19) (1.18) (1.20)
Urban County .424 .348 .452 Official County Classification
(.494) (.477) (.498)
Population (in 1,000) 179.0 167.0 183.6 1925 Census
(220.5) (215.9) (222.2)
Employment (in %):
Female Labor Force Participation Rate 37.28 37.96 36.99 1933 Census
(9.30) (11.39) (8.24)
Unemployment Rate 18.87 16.80 19.68 1933 Census
(9.24) (9.16) (9.14)
Sectoral Composition of Workforce (in %):
Agriculture 29.14 35.44 26.68 1933 Census
(26.71) (27.56) (25.98)
Manufacturing and Artisanry 35.22 33.02 36.08 1933 Census
(13.73) (13.66) (13.67)
Trade and Commerce 21.06 17.82 22.32 1933 Census
(12.18) (10.87) (12.43)
Services 10.17 9.39 10.48 1933 Census
(6.26) (5.83) (6.40)
Domestic Labor 4.41 4.32 4.45 1933 Census
(2.32) (2.28) (2.34)
Occupational Composition (in %):
Helping Family Members 17.46 22.72 15.41 1933 Census
(13.86) (15.61) (12.53)
White Collar Workers 13.40 11.59 14.11 1933 Census
(8.54) (8.05) (8.62)
Civil Servants 6.16 5.53 6.41 1933 Census
(3.94) (3.79) (3.98)
Blue Collar Workers 39.25 35.63 40.67 1933 Census
(9.66) (10.48) (8.93)
Domestic Servants 4.26 4.17 4.30 1933 Census
(2.21) (2.20) (2.21)
Self-Employed 19.46 20.36 19.11 1933 Census
(4.17) (5.11) (3.68)
Composition of Unemployed (in %):
White Collar Workers 13.62 11.74 14.35 1933 Census
(7.37) (6.47) (7.57)
Blue Collar Workers 83.40 85.26 82.68 1933 Census
(7.75) (6.83) (7.97)
Domestic Servants 2.98 3.00 2.97 1933 Census
(1.43) (1.31) (1.35)
Geography:
Latitude (in degrees North) 51.24 50.22 51.62 Own Calculations
(1.64) (1.55) (1.50)
Longitude (in degrees East) 11.00 9.67 11.50 Own Calculations
(3.27) (3.48) (3.07)
Distance to Berlin (in km) 323.2 460.1 272.2 Own Calculations
(161.5) (79.4) (154.5)
Distance to Major City (in km) 90.94 86.14 92.74 Own Calculations
(85.60) (70.78) (90.49)
Distance to Border (in km) 73.94 50.90 82.54 Own Calculations
(52.56) (40.40) (53.99)
Distance to Major Port (in km) 308.8 394.1 277.0 Own Calculations
(169.0) (177.8) (154.0)
Distance to Major River (in km) 36.69 31.03 38.79 Own Calculations
(57.75) (37.69) (63.53)
Distance to Ore or Coal Deposits (in km) 102.1 91.8 106.0 Own Calculations
(99.3) (84.3) (104.2)
Number of Counties 982 331 651
Religion of Majority
Table 2B: Summary Statistics
Notes:  Entries are population-weighted means and standard deviations of county-level data. The sample consists of 
counties with nonmissing information on religious composition and election results in November 1932. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percent Catholic -.190 -.243 -.243 -.250 -.255 -.280 -.293
(.019) (.017) (.015) (.017) (.020) (.028) (.025)
Demographics:
Percent Jewish .125 .206 .195 .157 .531 .145
(.367) (.414) (.430) (.409) (.461) (.284)
Percent Nonreligious -.978 -.971 -.913 -.875 -.774 -.666
(.139) (.152) (.155) (.152) (.155) (.121)
Percent Female .912 .599 1.304 1.280 1.783 .585
(.524) (.491) (.559) (.530) (.557) (.476)
Urban County -2.166 -1.589 .094 -.206 -.785 .312
(1.225) (1.020) (1.224) (1.197) (1.345) (1.114)
Log Population -1.217 -1.274 -.945 -.429 -.636 -.433
(.427) (.391) (.370) (.452) (.454) (.398)
Employment:
Female Labor Force Participation Rate .131 .059 .021 .001 .044
(.073) (.109) (.163) (.107) (.067)
Unemployment Rate .091 .247 .277 .214 -.070
(.104) (.143) (.163) (.127) (.074)
Sectoral Composition of Workforce (in %):
Manufacturing and Artisanry -.136 -.095 -.113 -.048
(.084) (.127) (.104) (.066)
Trade and Commerce -.218 -.283 -.385 -.102
(.083) (.133) (.141) (.132)
Services .032 -.391 -.458 -.146
(.077) (.136) (.119) (.107)
Domestic Labor -.133 -.412 -.812 -1.851
(.249) (2.153) (1.647) (1.557)
Occupational Composition (in %):
White Collar Workers -.020 .087 -.102
(.201) (.204) (.162)
Civil Servants .682 .901 .432
(.244) (.259) (.191)
Blue Collar Workers -.101 -.092 -.121
(.149) (.121) (.103)
Domestic Servants .474 .587 1.724
(2.317) (1.875) (1.657)
Self-Employed .109 .096 -.060
(.326) (.300) (.202)
Constant 32.365 5.735 15.64 -15.671 -18.133 88.923
(1.311) (23.900) (23.933) (24.990) (24.413) (96.606)
Geographical Controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Electoral District Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared .405 .609 .616 .633 .647 .664 .815
Number of Observations 982 982 982 982 982 982 982
Table 3: Religion and Nazi Vote Shares in the November Election of 1932
NSDAP Vote Share
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation (1) by weighted least squares. The 
dependent variable is a county's NSDAP vote share in the November elections of 1932. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are clustered by electoral district and reported in parentheses. The omitted category in Sectoral 
Composition of Workforce is Agriculture, and that in Occupational Composition is Helping Family Members. The set 
of Geographical Controls includes all geographical covariates shown in Table 2B. In addition to the variables shown in 
the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
County's Religion in 1624:
Catholic 70.807 65.568 65.501 64.895 61.266 49.555 42.513
(2.912) (3.284) (3.233) (3.168) (3.504) (2.999) (3.707)
Mixed 39.715 37.966 37.671 35.982 32.911 25.820 21.932
(5.176) (5.032) (5.289) (5.639) (5.664) (3.824) (3.377)
Demographics:
Percent Jewish .744 .659 .647 .410 .445 .460
(.831) (.796) (.769) (.497) (.418) (.358)
Percent Nonreligious -2.084 -2.345 -2.170 -2.161 -1.451 -1.044
(.557) (.609) (.500) (.493) (.448) (.476)
Percent Female .080 -.333 1.085 1.378 .187 .022
(1.253) (1.210) (1.268) (1.132) (.959) (.890)
Urban County 4.344 3.364 8.754 7.232 6.561 4.993
(4.120) (4.036) (6.298) (5.940) (3.038) (3.320)
Log Population 1.700 .878 2.236 2.161 .882 1.011
(1.462) (1.240) (1.530) (1.425) (1.103) (.882)
Employment:
Female Labor Force Participation Rate .128 .001 -.160 -.393 -.207
(.183) (.227) (.261) (.216) (.149)
Unemployment Rate .364 .641 .655 .494 .411
(.240) (.241) (.240) (.200) (.180)
Sectoral Composition of Workforce (in %):
Manufacturing and Artisanry -.194 .130 -.358 -.247
(.125) (.153) (.154) (.117)
Trade and Commerce -.633 -.580 -.467 -.439
(.264) (.274) (.210) (.220)
Services -.033 .009 .050 .241
(.243) (.293) (.331) (.419)
Domestic Labor .215 9.728 6.523 1.923
(.765) (5.574) (3.752) (2.694)
Occupational Composition (in %):
White Collar Workers -.130 .314 .205
(.494) (.333) (.424)
Civil Servants -.824 -1.047 -1.084
(.543) (.533) (.614)
Blue Collar Workers -1.136 -.758 -.665
(.327) (.267) (.266)
Domestic Servants -10.709 -8.254 -3.075
(5.723) (4.291) (3.025)
Self-Employed -1.648 -1.988 -3.075
(.653) (.591) (3.025)
Constant 12.499 -5.249 15.264 -56.652 11.131 635.78
(2.001) (60.707) (58.544) (56.752) (56.496) (166.20)
Geographical Controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Historical Controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Electoral District Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared .751 .774 .776 .784 .799 .858 .891
Number of Observations 982 982 982 982 982 982 982
Table 4: First-Stage Regressions
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation (2) by weighted least squares. 
The dependent variable is the share of Catholics (in percent) among a county's population. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by electoral district and reported in parentheses. The 
omitted category in Sectoral Composition of Workforce is Agriculture, and that in Occupational 
Composition is Helping Family Members. The set of Geographical Controls includes all geographical 
covariates shown in Table 2B, and Historical Controls includes the variables that Cantoni (2012) and Rubin 
(2014) have shown to be correlated with territorial lords' choices. In addition to the variables shown in the 
table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the 
Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Percent Catholic
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
County's Religion in 1624:
Catholic -13.540 -16.602 -16.620 -16.667 -15.842 -13.249 -11.739
(1.390) (1.184) (1.216) (1.246) (1.514) (1.690) (1.552)
Mixed -7.805 -8.105 -7.760 -7.565 -7.174 -6.260 -5.653
(1.483) (1.834) (1.872) (1.987) (1.950) (1.520) (1.144)
Demographics:
Percent Jewish -.032 .067 .055 .083 .383 -.005
(.261) (.308) (.325) (.411) (.441) (.301)
Percent Nonreligious -.498 -.424 -.382 -.329 -.371 -.333
(.146) (.181) (.187) (.188) (.203) (.186)
Percent Female .944 .732 1.044 .941 1.646 .500
(.643) (.603) (.628) (.623) (.634) (.577)
Urban County -3.313 -2.407 -2.331 -2.245 -2.662 -1.327
(1.581) (1.429) (1.903) (2.022) (1.514) (1.683)
Log Population -1.658 -1.491 -1.562 -1.043 -.830 -.875
(.554) (.475) (.510) (.610) (.5270 (.482)
Employment:
Female Labor Force Participation Rate .109 .070 .075 .120 .098
(.068) (.089) (.099) (.119) (.082)
Unemployment Rate -.003 .081 .106 .043 -.195
(.123) (.154) (.166) (.107) (.097)
Sectoral Composition of Workforce (in %):
Manufacturing and Artisanry -.088 -.131 -.011 .023
(.089) (.122) (.098) (.068)
Trade and Commerce -.046 -.116 -.196 .036
(.091) (.131) (.138) (.148)
Services .060 -.374 -.437 -.188
(.085) (.167) (.150) (.148)
Domestic Labor -.215 -2.810 -2.858 -2.237
(.281) (2.264) (1.966) (1.784)
Occupational Composition (in %):
White Collar Workers .001 -.055 -.164
(.242) (.212) (.210)
Civil Servants .890 1.153 .684
(.267) (.249) (.241)
Blue Collar Workers .192 .107 .068
(.184) (.140) (.127)
Domestic Servants 3.098 3.136 2.447
(2.565) (2.200) (1.946)
Self-Employed .515 .611 .490
(.407) (.336) (.294)
Constant 30.031 4.776 9.056 -2.009 -21.378 -117.29
(1.168) (30.199) (29.878) (28.759) (29.590) (120.52)
Geographical Controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Historical Controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Electoral District Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared .309 .475 .483 .490 .504 .555 .711
Number of Observations 982 982 982 982 982 982 982
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation (3) by weighted least squares. 
The dependent variable is a county's NSDAP vote share in the November elections of 1932. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by electoral district and reported in parentheses. The 
omitted category in Sectoral Composition of Workforce is Agriculture, and that in Occupational 
Composition is Helping Family Members. The set of Geographical Controls includes all geographical 
covariates shown in Table 2B, and Historical Controls includes the variables that Cantoni (2012) and Rubin 
(2014) have shown to be correlated with territorial lords' choices. In addition to the variables shown in the 
table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the 
Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Table 5: Reduced Form Results
NSDAP Vote Share
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percent Catholic -.192 -.248 -.248 -.252 -.255 -.265 -.275
(.020) (.016) (.015) (.017) (.020) (.027) (.027)
Demographics:
Percent Jewish .119 .199 .193 .156 .495 .120
(.362) (.407) (.422) (.400) (.429) (.267)
Percent Nonreligious -1.008 -1.001 -.926 -.879 -.749 -.622
(.144) (.157) (.159) (.153) (.156) (.112)
Percent Female .912 .597 1.309 1.282 1.701 .512
(.513) (.481) (.548) (.520) (.531) (.456)
Urban County -2.112 -1.544 .139 -.193 -.863 .074
(1.198) (.997) (1.197) (1.199) (1.277) (1.109)
Log Population -1.190 -1.254 -7.482 -.424 -.579 -.598
(.417) (.379) (4.206) (.441) (.397) (.336)
Employment:
Female Labor Force Participation Rate .131 .059 .020 .012 .039
(.072) (.107) (.114) (.107) (.060)
Unemployment Rate .093 .248 .277 .175 -.080
(.102) (.140) (.159) (.102) (.070)
Sectoral Composition of Workforce (in %):
Manufacturing and Artisanry -.136 -.094 -.107 -.044
(.082) (.126) (.099) (.063)
Trade and Commerce -.221 -.283 -.328 -.085
(.080) (.130) (.126) (.122)
Services .032 -.390 -.433 -.126
(.076) (.136) (.110) (.103)
Domestic Labor -.135 -.400 -1.144 -1.709
(.245) (2.137) (1.623) (1.581)
Occupational Composition (in %):
White Collar Workers -.021 .035 -.112
(.199) (.183) (.152)
Civil Servants .680 .883 -.112
(.244) (.237) (.152)
Blue Collar Workers -.103 -.093 .391
(.149) (.117) (.179)
Domestic Servants .459 .968 1.601
(2.303) (1.851) (1.698)
Self-Employed .107 .092 -.029
(.316) (.270) (.203)
Constant 32.415 5.648 15.646 -15.958 -18.118 49.431
(1.344) (23.393) (23.450) (24.494) (23.780) (102.73)
Geographical Controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Historical Controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Electoral District Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
First Stage F-Statistic 313.79 201.10 209.11 213.45 165.05 142.24 71.91
Overidentification Test [p-value] .861 .181 .146 .156 .245 .523 .464
Number of Observations 982 982 982 982 982 982 982
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation (4) by weighted two-stage least squares. The 
dependent variable is a county's NSDAP vote share in the November elections of 1932, and the share of Catholics is 
considered endogenous. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by electoral district and reported in 
parentheses. The omitted category in Sectoral Composition of Workforce is Agriculture, and that in Occupational 
Composition is Helping Family Members. The set of Geographical Controls includes all geographical covariates shown in 
Table 2B, and Historical Controls includes the variables that Cantoni (2012) and Rubin (2014) have shown to be correlated 
with territorial lords' choices. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each 
covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Table 6: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Religion on Nazi Vote Shares in the November Election of 1932
NSDAP Vote Share
Specification / Sample OLS
Baseline -.293 -.275
(.025) (.027)
As Percentage of Valid Votes -.361 -.338
(.024) (.028)
Sample:
Unweighted -.291 -.281
(.033) (.032)
Excluding Prussia -.284 -.273
(.047) (.037)
Excluding Bavaria -.282 -.261
(.026) (.028)
Above Average Share of Catholics -.327 -.339
(.027) (.059)
Below Average Share of Catholics -.256 -.414
(.066) (.141)
Additional Controls:
Additional Labor Force Controls -.286 -.268
(.026) (.028)
Composition of Unemployed -.291 -.277
(.025) (.027)
Major Parties' Vote Shares in 1920 -.261 -.223
(.023) (.035)
Proxy for Historical Anti-Semitism -.295 -.278
(.025) (.027)
Instrument:
Based on Religious Situation in 1555 -- -.274
(.026)
Dependent Variable:
NSDAP Vote Share July 1930 -.145 -.133
(.019) (.022)
NSDAP Vote Share July 1932 -.335 -.318
(.027) (.029)
NSDAP Vote Share 1933 -.293 -.279
(.019) (.023)
Δ NSDAP Vote Share -.267 -.253
November 1932 − May 1928 (.022) (.023)
IV
Table 7: Additional Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Checks
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on Percent Catholic from 
estimating the empirical models in equations (1) and (4) by weighted least 
squares and weighted two-stage least squares, respectively. The respective 
sample restriction, set of additional controls, alternative instrument, or 
dependent variable is shown in the column on the left. Heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are clustered by electoral district and reported in 
parentheses. To ensure comparability with the baseline results in Tables 3 and 
6, all results also control for the covariates used in the most inclusive 
specifications in those tables. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition 
and source of each variable.
A. Results for 1933
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Percent Catholic -.294 -.292 -.309 -.279 -.276 -.239
(.020) (.019) (.019) (.023) (.022) (.052)
Unit of Observation County Municipality Municipality County Municipality Municipality
Standard Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Electoral District Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
County Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
First Stage F-Statistic -- -- -- 71.75 42.77 4.55
R-Squared .821 .764 .919 -- -- --
Number of Observations 981 3,502 3,502 981 3,502 3,502
B. Results for 1930
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Percent Catholic -.145 -.144 -.140 -.133 -.139 -.157
(.019) (.018) (.023) (.022) (.022) (.048)
Unit of Observation County Municipality Municipality County Municipality Municipality
Standard Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Electoral District Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
County Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
First Stage F-Statistic -- -- -- 65.64 44.75 5.05
R-Squared .633 .545 .853 -- -- --
Number of Observations 977 3,577 3,577 977 3,577 3,577
Table 8: Comparison of County- and Municipality-Level Results
NSDAP Vote Share 1933
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on Percent Catholic from estimating the empirical models in equations 
(1) and (4) by weighted least squares and weighted two-stage least squares, respectively. The dependent variable in the 
upper panel is the NSDAP's vote share in the elections of March 1933. The lower panel uses that in September of 1930 
instead. Within each set of regressions the leftmost specification is based on county-level data, whereas the middle and right 
most ones rely on municipality-level data instead. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by electoral district 
and reported in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
NSDAP Vote Share 1930
Party Catholics Protestants Catholics Protestants Catholics Protestants Catholics Protestants Catholics Protestants Catholics Protestants Catholics Protestants Catholics Protestants
Far Left:
KPD .015 .017 .085 .096 .063 .070 .077 .079 .113 .108 .124 .120 .137 .134 .109 .109
[.000, .016] [.000, .017] [.042, .090] [.052, .100] [.018, .066] [.025, .074] [.032, .081] [.035, .083] [.070, .118] [.065, .113] [.082, .130] [.078, .126] [.095, .144] [.092, .140] [.066, .114] [.066, .114]
Democratic Parties:
SPD .108 .199 .077 .197 .122 .244 .136 .267 .109 .242 .103 .218 .096 .196 .091 .195
[.068, .116] [.159, .207] [.036, .085] [.157, .205] [.083, .131] [.205, .253] [.098, .146] [.229, .278] [.070, .118] [.204, .252] [.064, .112] [.118, .226] [.055, .104] [.156, .204] [.050, .099] [.155, .203]
DDP .015 .090 .018 .057 .024 .064 .020 .046 .014 .040 .006 .010 .005 .009 .005 .009
[.000, .019] [.045, .093] [.000, .020] [.011, .060] [.000, .026] [.018, .066] [.000, .022] [.000, .049] [.000, .015] [.000, .042] [.000, .006] [.000, .010] [.000, .005] [.000, .009] [.000, .005] [.000, .009]
Zentrum / BVP .545 .000 .456 .000 .474 .000 .402 .000 .453 .000 .463 .000 .425 .000 .427 .000
[.504, .553] [.000, .000] [.414, .463] [.000, .000] [.433, .481] [.000, .000] [.359, .407] [.000, .000] [.410, .458] [.000, .000] [.421, .469] [.000, .000] [.382, .431] [.000, .000] [.384, .433] [.000, .000]
DVP .045 .137 .043 .080 .048 .092 .039 .077 .027 .042 .005 .012 .007 .019 .005 .012
[.002, .051] [.094, .142] [.000, .046] [.035, .083] [.003, .052] [.048, .096] [.032, .042] [.032, .081] [.000, .028] [.000, .043] [.000, .006] [.000, .013] [.000, .008] [.000, .019] [.000, .005][.000,  .013]
Right Wing:
DNVP .000 .196 .000 .228 .000 .243 .000 .159 .019 .075 .012 .067 .018 .090 .025† .092†
[.000, .000] [.153, .202] [.000, .002] [.187, .235] [.000, .000] [.203, .251] [.000, .003] [.116, .165] [.000, .022] [.030, .078] [.000, .014] [.021, .070] [.000, .022] [.045, .094] [.000, .029] [.047, .096]
Far Right:
NSDAP -- -- .016* .070* .003* .034* .005 .028 .058 .191 .095 .413 .079 .354 .199 .478
[.000, .018] [.024, .072] [.000, .004] [.000, .035] [.000, .006] [.000, .029] [.017, .065] [.150, .198] [.061, .110] [.379, .428] [.044, .092] [.319, .367] [.170, .218] [.448, .496]
Notes:  Tables show estimated vote shares among Catholics and Protestants for each major party in every parliamentary election during the Weimar Republic. Values in brackets are theoretical bounds. The discussion in Section 5 
describes the derivation of these numbers. Vote shares do not generally add up to unity, as they are calcuted as a fraction of all eligible voters. Asterisks (*) mark years in which the NSDAP was officially outlawed. In these years the 
Nazis formed an electoral alliance with other parties in the völkisch  bloc, running as NSFP in May 1924 and as NSFB in December 1924.  Daggers (†) mark years in which the DNVP campaigned together with the Stahlhelm and 
Landbund as Kampffront Schwarz-Weiß-Rot. Results for the Zentrum include the BVP.
Table 9: Major Parties' Vote Shares, by Religion
1920 May 1924 December 1924 1928 1930 July 1932 November 1932 1933
Chow Test for Equality
of OLS Coefficients
Restriction / Sample OLS IV p -value
Baseline -.293 -.275
(.025) (.027)
By Attitude of Catholic Priest:
Villages with "Brown Priest" -.203 -.149
(.023) (.040) .014
Villages without "Brown Priest" -.299 -.291
(.020) (.023)
By Structure of Environment:
Urban County -.205 -.161
(.025) (.024) .005
Rural County -.309 -.304
(.027) (.032)
By Fraction of Catholics Voting for the 
Zentrum Party in 1920: 
Lowest Quartile -.198 -.170
(.054) (.054)
Second Quartile -.261 -.244 .008
(.028) (.026)
Third Quartile -.333 -.362
(.050) (.045)
Highest Quartile -.320 -.339
(.024) (.034)
Table 10: Religious Differences in NSDAP Vote Shares by Social Environment
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on Percent Catholic from estimating the empirical models in 
equations (1) and (4) by weighted least squares and weighted two-stage least squares, respectively. The respective 
sample description is shown in the column on the left. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by 
electoral district and reported in parentheses. To ensure comparability with the baseline results in Tables 3 and 6, the 
set of covariates is the same as in the most inclusive specifications in those tables. The column on the very right 
displays p -values from a Chow test for equality of the coefficients estimated by lest squares, i.e. those in the column 
labeled "OLS." See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Chow Test for Equality
of OLS Coefficients
Restriction / Sample OLS IV p -value
Baseline -.293 -.275
(.025) (.027)
By Region:
Prussia -.305 -.288
(.017) (.020) .585
Remainder of Germany -.284 -.273
(.047) (.037)
Catholic Heartland -.300 -.235
(.024) (.028) .784
Catholic Diaspora -.288 -.282
(.039) (.032)
By Historical Religion of Area (c. 1624): 
Catholic -.264 --
(.070)
Lutheran -.272 -- .017
(.034)
Calvinist -.397 --
(.055)
By Reliogiosity of Parishoners: 
Lower Tercile -.343 -.331
(.025) (.027)
Middle Tercile -.322 -.320 .198
(.025) (.042)
Upper Tercile -.278 -.232
(.040) (.030)
Table 11: Testing Alternative Explanations for the Effect of Religion on Nazi Vote Shares
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on Percent Catholic from estimating the empirical models in 
equations (1) and (4) by weighted least squares and weighted two-stage least squares, respectively. The respective 
sample description is shown in the column on the left. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by 
electoral district and reported in parentheses. To ensure comparability with the baseline results in Tables 3 and 6, the 
set of covariates is the same as in the most inclusive specifications in those tables. The column on the very right 
displays p -values from a Chow test for equality of the coefficients estimated by lest squares, i.e. those in the column 
labeled "OLS." We define "Catholic Heartland" as the regions of Rhineland, Westphalia, Baden, as well as South-
East Bavaria, and "Catholic Diaspora" as the remainder of Germany. See the Data Appendix for the precise 
definition and source of all remaining variables.
Sample Mean and Number
Outcomes OLS IV Standard Deviation of Observations
Before March 1933:
NSDAP Party Membership, December 1932 -.023 -.022 2.66 712
(as percentage of population) (.006) (.007) (1.88)
Pogrom in the 1920s -.013 -.010 2.67 1,199
(× 100) (.013) (.017) (16.13)
After March 1933:
Attack on Synagogues During the Reichskristallnacht,  1938 .136 .173 81.40 989
(× 100) (.040) (.056) (38.93)
Letters to Der Stürmer , 1935–1938 .007 .011 1.88 1,222
(per 10,000 residents) (.004) (.007) (5.02)
Deportations, 1933–1945 .205 .149 34.21 930
(as percentage of Jewish population) (.062) (.073) (52.29)
Table 12: Religious Differences in Proxies for Anti-Semitism and Nazi Ideology, Before and After March 1933
Notes:  Columns labeled OLS and IV display coefficients and standard errors on Percent Catholic. The respective dependent variable is shown in 
the column on the left. Measures of counties' NSDAP party membership rates have been constructed based on the nationally representative data set 
of Falter and Kater (1993). All other outcomes come from the city-lelvel data set constructed by Voigtländer and Voth (2012). When using their 
data we employ Voigtländer and Voth's (2012) original set of covariates, i.e. cities' religious composition, an indicator vairbale for whether a city 
experienced pogroms during the Black Death (1348–50), and log population, but rely on their extended sample to preserve as much information as 
possible. All other specifications use our standard set of covariates, i.e. those contained in the most inclusive specifications in Tables 3 and 6. The 
instrumental variable used for the 2SLS estimates is always territorial lords' religion, as described in Section 4.1. For a detailed description of the 
data used in this table, see Schneider-Haase (1991), Voigtländer and Voth (2012), or the Data Appendix to this paper.
Figure A.1: Distribution of Catholics Across Counties
Notes: Figure depicts a population-weighted kernel density estimate of the distribution 
of counties' share of Catholics. Estimates use an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth 
of 7.5.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent Catholic -.229 -.255 -.223 -.275 -.274
(.060) (.112) (.076) (.027) (.026)
Distance to Wittenberg (in km) .084 .130 .046
(.031) (.046) (.029)
County's Religion in 1624:
Catholic 42.513
(3.707)
Mixed 21.932
(3.377)
Demographics:
Percent Jewish -1.280 .366 .460 .215 .112 .095 .123 .122
(1.336) (.563) (.358) (.431) (.279) (.271) (.264) (.264)
Percent Nonreligious -4.341 -1.877 -1.044 -.724 -.584 -.524 -.620 -.618
(1.185) (.673) (.476) (.417) (.217) (.175) (.111) (.110)
Percent Female 3.209 .928 .022 1.191 .493 .453 .517 .516
(2.018) (1.374) (.890) (.540) (.509) (.455) (.445) (.444)
Urban County 15.930 4.916 4.993 -.768 -.026 -.219 .092 .085
(4.943) (3.556) (3.320) (1.810) (1.367) (1.313) (1.086) (1.088)
Log Population 5.306 .495 1.011 -.635 -.608 -.616 -.603 -.603
(1.800) (.909) (.882) (.530) (.342) (.349) (.337) (.337)
Employment:
Female Labor Force Participation Rate -.349 -.392 -.207 .041 .047 .059 .039 .039
(.515) (.182) (.149) (.125) (.086) (.068) (.061) (.061)
Unemployment Rate .631 .249 .411 .267 -.085 -.093 -.080 -.081
(.388) (.191) (.180) (.174) (.074) (.073) (.070) (.070)
Sectoral Composition of Workforce (in %):
Manufacturing and Artisanry .814 -.023 -.247 -.120 -.044 -.042 -.045 -.045
(.388) (.155) (.117) (.107) (.064) (.062) (.062) (.062)
Trade and Commerce -.102 -.200 -.439 -.273 -.081 -.073 -.086 -.085
(.429) (.304) (.220) (.126) (.134) (.125) (.120) (.120)
Services 1.742 .961 .241 -.444 -.146 -.175 -.128 -.129
(.724) (.625) (.419) (.182) (.111) (.105) (.100) (.100)
Domestic Labor 27.735 4.463 1.923 -.982 -1.799 -1.932 -1.719 -1.723
(10.161) (3.030) (2.694) (3.048) (1.453) (1.519) (1.564) (1.564)
Occupational Composition (in %):
White Collar Workers -1.840 -.324 .205 .026 -.106 -.092 -.114 -.114
(.771) (.590) (.424) (.233) (.147) (.160) (.155) (.155)
Civil Servants -3.724 -2.201 -1.084 .808 .435 .503 .394 .397
(1.129) (.702) (.614) (.371) (.231) (.213) (.173) (.173)
Blue Collar Workers -2.592 -1.340 -.665 -.017 -.090 -.047 -.116 -.114
(.666) (.390) (.266) (.235) (.155) (.147) (.104) (.104)
Domestic Servants -31.385 -7.272 -3.075 1.134 1.749 1.973 1.613 1.620
(10.706) (3.525) (3.025) (3.413) (1.578) (1.642) (1.679) (1.678)
Self-Employed -3.625 -2.853 -1.881 .216 .029 .123 -.028 -.025
(1.129) (.874) (.657) (.452) (.337) (.309) (.203) (.204)
Constant -21.539 -18.794
(100.333) (24.892)
Geographical Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remaining Historical Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Electoral District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments:
Distance to Wittenberg -- -- -- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance to Wittenberg Squared -- -- -- No No Yes No Yes
Distance to Wittenberg Cubed -- -- -- No No Yes No Yes
Historically Catholic -- -- -- No No No Yes Yes
Historically Mixed -- -- -- No No No Yes Yes
First Stage F-Statistic -- -- -- 7.51 7.88 7.68 56.49 35.34
Overidentification Test [p-value] -- -- -- -- -- .924 .750 .753
Number of Observations 982 982 982 982 982 982 982 982
Table A.1: Alternative Instrumental Variable Estimates
NSDAP Vote Share, November 1932
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equations (A.1) and (A.2) by weighted least squares and weighted two-stage 
least squares, respectively. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is a county's share of Catholics, and that in columns (4)–(8) is a county's 
NSDAP vote share in the November elections of 1932. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by electoral district and reported in 
parentheses. The omitted category in Sectoral Composition of Workforce is Agriculture, and that in Occupational Composition is Helping Family 
Members. The set of Geographical Controls includes all geographical covariates shown in Table 2B, and Historical Controls includes the variables 
that Cantoni (2012) and Rubin (2014) have shown to be correlated with territorial lords' choices. In addition to the variables shown in the table, 
indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and 
source of each variable.
Percent Catholic
Attidude of Catholic Priest May 1924 December 1924 March 1933
Villages with "Brown Priest" in 1933 -.064 -.034 -.203
(.019) (.013) (.023)
Villages without "Brown Priest" in 1933 -.063 -.032 -.299
(.013) (.006) (.020)
Chow Test for Equality of Coefficients [p -value] .942 .909 .014
Table A.2: Religious Differences in NSDAP Vote Shares, by Attitude of Catholic Priest in 1933
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on Percent Catholic from estimating equation (1) by 
weighted least squares for the parliamentary elections in May 1924, December 1924, and March 1933. 
Villages are said to have had a "brown priest" in 1933 if a priest listed in Spicer (2008) lived within a 10 
kilometer radius. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by electoral district and reported 
in parentheses. To ensure comparability of results the set of covariates is the same as in Table 10. The last 
row displays p -values from a Chow test for equality of the coefficients for villages with and without a 
"brown priest." See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Religious Difference in NSDAP Vote Share
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Uniqueness
Mass Attendance .846 .356 -.180 .110 .113
Easter Communion .879 .306 -.176 .088 .095
Religiously Mixed Marriages -.905 .316 .106 .192 .033
Babies from Religiously Mixed Marriages -.865 .476 .103 .008 .014
Out-of-Wedlock Births -.470 -.625 -.091 .195 .343
Christenings .908 -.269 .202 .057 .060
Church Burrials .804 .098 .331 .062 .231
Table A.3: Factor Analysis of Proxy Variables for Catholics' Religiosity
Notes:  Entries are factor loadings and uniquenesses from factor analyzing the variables listed in the column on the left. 
We retain the first factor as our measure of Catholics' religiosity. The first four factors have eigenvalues of 4.75, 1.02, 
.24, and .10, respectively. But the first factor alone explains 79.6% of the variance in its components. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
